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Summary 
 
In order for disaster management to be effective and successful, efforts to improve 
preparedness at governmental, sectoral and institutional levels should be supported by 
corresponding efforts at community and individual levels. However, getting the 
cooperation of individuals and communities is a complex issue with many inherent 
difficulties. 
The megacity Istanbul is located in an earthquake risk zone and is expected to experience 
an earthquake in the near future, but on the individual level there appears to be limited 
interest in preparing for such an earthquake.  This study aims to investigate the process of 
taking action to prepare for an earthquake and mitigate its effects at individual level, to 
identify the factors influencing this process and to asses the level of preparedness in 
Istanbul. 
The study was conducted in two districts of Istanbul with different levels of earthquake 
risk. Within these districts three socioeconomic levels (SEL) were considered. 
The study is in two parts. In the first part, 12 focus group discussions (FGDs) with 
citizens living in Bakırköy (higher risk) and Beykoz (lower risk) and 11 in-depth 
interviews with experts, authorities and key informants were conducted. In the second 
part, a field survey was carried out in the same districts. A questionnaire was prepared 
according to the results of the first part of the study and was administered face-to-face by 
trained interviewers. A total of 1123 people were interviewed. 
The qualitative part of the study demonstrated that, within our conceptual framework, 
which describes the process of taking action to prepare for an earthquake and mitigate its 
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effects, the behaviour of the group participants fell into three different patterns. The first 
and most common pattern was interruption of the impetus towards taking action after or 
during the “awareness” stage by intervening social, personal and environmental factors. 
Less commonly, the first or subsequent step or steps were taken, but again the process 
was interrupted before successful completion. Completion of the process was the least 
common pattern among the group participants. 
The qualitative part of the study identified the obstacle to taking action to mitigate 
damage from earthquakes and to be prepared for them as: low socioeconomic level; 
absence of belief in the efficacy of measures, for example regarding nonstructural or 
microscale-measures; helplessness; a culture of negligence; lack of trust in the building 
sector; environmental factors such as poor predictability and suddenness of onset; and 
normalisation bias. Factors motivating individuals to take action were: living in higher-
risk areas; a higher educational level; direct experience of earthquakes through 
participating in rescue and solidarity activities during past events; and social interaction. 
In our survey sample, 54% of the respondents had taken at least 3 of the 11 measures we 
asked about and 12% had not taken any measures. The five leading measures generally 
taken by the respondents were: getting the building tested for construction quality (51%), 
keeping a torch near the bed (49%), fixing high furniture to walls (39%), obtaining 
earthquake insurance (38%) and having a family disaster plan (32%). Testing the 
building for construction quality and obtaining earthquake insurance were significantly 
more frequent in the high-risk area (X2: 296.6, p<0.001; X2: 89.34, p<0.001). 
Logistic regression analysis indicated that education level of the respondents (odds ratio, 
OR: 2.8, confidence interval, CI: 1.8, 4.4) was the leading factor associated with taking at 
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least three measures, followed by living in a higher-risk area (OR: 2.3, CI: 1.6, 3.1), 
participating in rescue and solidarity activities in past earthquakes (OR: 2.0, CI: 1.2, 2.1), 
a higher earthquake knowledge score (OR: 1.9, CI: 1.4, 2.6), owning the home (OR: 1.8, 
CI: 1.3, 2.4), living in a neighbourhood known to be inhabited by people with higher 
SELs (OR: 1.6, CI: 1.1, 2.3), a higher action-stimulating attitudes score (OR: 1.5, CI: 1.2, 
2.1) and general safety score (OR: 1.5, CI: 1.1, 2.2) and being in the young age group 
(16-34 years olds, OR: 0.6, CI: 0.4, 0.99). 
It is not easy to change the situation of individuals regarding the factors that are 
significantly associated with taking action. They need interventions in the political, social 
and economic systems. But knowledge about earthquakes is the one factor that could be 
improved through simpler interventions such as effective awareness programmes. Thus 
every effort should be made effectively to provide earthquake information to the public. 
Awareness programmes should focus on informing people about how to cope with 
earthquakes and how to personalise the risk rather than on information about the risk 
itself and its consequences. In addition, these programmes should involve activities 
targeted on changing people’s attitudes towards different types of measure, actors in 
disaster management and their own capacity, and to creating a culture of safety in the 
public. 
The target populations in the awareness programmes should be people with a lower 
educational level living in all areas, tenants, people living in low socioeconomic districts 
and young people. People who have participated in rescue and solidarity activities could 
be given appropriate roles and responsibilities to reach the community and local people. 
Zusammenfassung 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Ein wirksames und erfolgreiches Katastrophenmanagement sollte zusätzlich zu den 
Anstrengungen zur Verbesserung der Bereitschaft auf Staats-, Branchen- und 
institutioneller Ebene auch durch entsprechende individuelle und gesellschaftliche 
Bemühungen unterstützt werden. Eine Zusammenarbeit von Individuen und der 
Gesellschaft zu erreichen ist jedoch eine komplexe Angelegenheit, welche mit vielen 
inhärenten Schwierigkeiten einher geht.  
Die Megastadt Istanbul befindet sich in einer Erdbebenrisikozone und es wird erwartet, 
dass sie in naher Zukunft von einem Erdstoss getroffen werden wird. Auf individueller 
Ebene jedoch scheint nur ein eingeschränktes Interesse an entsprechenden 
Vorsichtsmassnahmen zu bestehen. Das Ziel der vorliegenden Dissertation ist es, den 
Maßnahmenprozess betreffend der Vorbereitung auf ein Erdbeben und der Minderung 
dessen Folgen auf der individuellen Ebene zu untersuchen, die Faktoren zu eruieren, 
welche diesen Prozess beeinflussen, und den Stand der Bereitschaft in Istanbul zu 
bestimmen. 
Die Studie wurde in zwei einem unterschiedlichen Erdbebenrisiko ausgesetzten Bezirken 
Istanbuls durchgeführt. Innerhalb dieser Bezirke wurden drei sozioökonomische Niveaus 
(socio-economic level; SEL) betrachtet.  
Die Studie umfasst zwei Teile: Als Erstes wurden 12 Fokusgruppen-Diskussionen (focus 
group discussions; FGDs) mit Einwohnern von Bakırköy (höheres Risiko) und Beykoz 
(niedrigeres Risiko) und 11 detaillierte Interviews mit Experten, Behördenvertretern und 
anderen wichtigen Auskunftspersonen durchgeführt. Nächstens wurde eine Erhebung in 
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denselben Bezirken durchgeführt. Ein Fragebogen wurde entsprechend den im ersten Teil 
der Studie gewonnenen Erkenntnissen vorbereitet, und die Interviews durch ausgebildete 
Befrager persönlich durchgeführt. Insgesamt wurden 1123 Personen befragt.  
Der qualitative Teil der Studie ergab, dass sich das Verhalten der Befragten in dem von 
uns entwickelten Bezugssystem, welches den Prozess der Vorbereitung auf ein Erdbeben 
und der Massnahmen zur Schadenminimierung beschreibt, in drei verschiedene 
Kategorien unterteilen lässt. Das häufigste Verhaltensmuster war ein während oder nach 
der Bewusstseinsbildung erfolgter Abbruch des Impulses, Vorbereitungen zu treffen, 
ausgelöst durch den Einfluss von sozialen, persönlichen und Umgebungsfaktoren. 
Weniger häufig wurden ein oder mehrere Schritte unternommen, doch dann wurde der 
Prozess wiederum unterbrochen bevor er zu einem erfolgreichen Abschluss gebracht 
wurde. Die Beendigung des Vorbereitungsprozesses war das seltenste Verhaltensmuster 
unter den Teilnehmern. 
Der quantitative Teil der Studie identifizierte die folgenden Faktoren als Hindernisse zum 
Ergreifen von Maßnahmen zur Minimierung von Erdbebenschäden und zur Vorbereitung 
auf ein solches Ereignis: niedriges sozioökonomisches Niveau, Skepsis gegenüber der 
Wirksamkeit von Maßnahmen, z.B. bezüglich nicht-struktureller oder sehr beschränkter 
Massnahmen, Hilflosigkeit, eine Kultur der Nachlässigkeit, fehlendes Vertrauen in den 
Bausektor, Faktoren wie die sehr beschränkte Vorhersagbarkeit und das plötzliche 
Auftreten des Ereignisses, und die Normalisierungsverzerrung (Normalisation Bias). 
Motivierende Faktoren für das Ergreifen von Massnahmen waren: Wohnen in einem 
Hochrisikogebiet, ein besserer Ausbildungsstand, direkte Erfahrung mit Erdbeben mittels 
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einer Teilnahme an Rettungs- und Solidaritätsaktionen nach vorangegangenen Erdbeben, 
und soziale Interaktionen. 
In unserer Stichprobe hatten 54% der Antwortenden mindestens 3 der 11 Maßnahmen 
getroffen, welche wir ansprachen, und 12% hatten überhaupt nichts unternommen. Die 5 
von den Befragten am häufigsten unternommenen Massnahmen waren: Veranlassen eines 
Gutachtens betreffend der Bauqualität des Gebäudes (51%), Bereithalten einer 
Taschenlampe nahe dem Bett (49%), Befestigen großer Möbel an der Wand (39%), 
Abschliessen einer Erdbebenversicherung (38%) und das Erstellen eines 
Familiennotfallplans (32%). Das Überprüfen der Bauqualität des Gebäudes und das 
Abschliessen einer Erdbebenversicherung wurden im Hochrisikogebiet signifikant 
häufiger erwähnt (X2: 296.6, p<0.001; X2: 89.34, p<0.001). 
Eine logistische Regressionsanalyse ergab, dass das Ausbildungsniveau der 
Antwortenden der wichtigste erklärende Faktor war für das Ergreifen von mindestens 
drei Maßnahmen (odds ratio; OR: 2.8, Konfidenzintervall; KI: 1.8, 4.4), gefolgt vom 
Wohnen in einem Gebiet mit erhöhtem Risiko (OR: 2.3, KI: 1.6, 3.1), der Teilnahme an 
Rettungs- und Solidaritätsaktionen nach früheren Erdbeben (OR: 2.0, KI: 1.2, 2.1), einem 
höheren Wissensstand über Erdbeben (OR: 1.9, KI: 1.4, 2.6), Hausbesitz (OR: 1.8, KI: 
1.3, 2.4), dem Wohnen in einem Geviert mit bekanntermassen ökonomisch besser 
gestellten Einwohnern (OR: 1.6, KI: 1.1, 2.3), dem besseren Abschneiden bezüglich 
einem Mass an aktivitätsfördernder Einstellung (OR: 1.5, KI: 1.2, 2.1) und dem 
allgemeinen Sicherheitsverhalten (OR: 1.5, KI: 1.1, 2.2), und der Zugehörigkeit zu der 
jungen Altersklasse (16 - 34 Jahre; OR: 0.6, KI: 0.4, 0.99). 
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Es ist nicht einfach, die individuelle Lage bezüglich der signifikant mit dem Ergreifen 
von Massnahmen assoziierten Faktoren zu verändern. Hierzu sind Aktivitäten auf der 
politischen, sozialen und ökonomischen Ebene erforderlich.  Das Wissen bezüglich 
Erdbeben ist jedoch ein Faktor, welcher durch relativ einfache Interventionen wie z.B. 
effektive Erziehungsprogramme verbessert werden kann. Daher sollte jede mögliche 
Anstrengung unternommen werden um das Wissen der Bevölkerung über Erdbeben zu 
verbessern. Programme zur Förderung des Bewusstseins sollten erstens darauf abzielen, 
dass Individuen das Risiko als ein persönliches wahrnehmen, und zweitens die 
Bevölkerung darüber informieren, wie sie bei einem Erdbeben reagieren soll. Diese 
Informationen sind nützlicher als solche über über die Gefahr selbst und deren Folgen. 
Zusätzlich sollten diese Programme Aktivitäten umfassen, welche auf eine Änderung der 
Einstellung gegenüber verschiedenen Massnahmen, Akteuren des 
Katastrophenmanagements und ihrer eigenen Fähigkeiten abzielen sowie auf den Aufbau 
einer öffentlichen Sicherheitskultur.  
Das Zielpublikum dieser Programme zur Bewusstseinsförderung sollten Bewohner der 
Gebieten mit erhöhtem und niedrigem Risiko, Personen mit einem niedrigen 
Bildungsniveau, Mieter, Bewohner von Vierteln mit tiefem sozio-ökonomischem Niveau 
sowie Junge sein. Teilnehmer an früheren Rettungs- und Solidaritätsaktivitäten könnten 
angemessene Rollen und Verantwortungen übernehmen um die Öffentlichkeit und die 
lokalen Bewohner zu erreichen. 
Özet 
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Özet 
 
Etkili ve başarılı bir afet yönetimi gerçekleştirmek için, devlet/hükümet düzeyindeki, 
sektörel ve kurumsal düzeydeki hazırlıkları iyileştirilmesi çabası toplumsal ve bireysel 
düzeyde benzer bir çaba ile desteklenmelidir. Ancak, bireylerin ve toplumun desteğini 
almak birçok kronik zorluğu olan karmaşık bir konudur.  
Megakent Istanbul bir deprem bölgesinde yer almaktadır ve yakın bir gelecekte deprem 
yaşaması beklenmektedir, fakat bireyler arasında beklenen depreme hazırlanma 
konusunda sınırlı bir ilgi vardır. Bu noktadan yola çıkarak çalışmamız bireysel düzeyde, 
deprem hazırlığına ve deprem zararlarını önlemeye yönelik eylemde bulunma sürecini 
araştırmayı, bu süreci etkileyen faktörleri belirlemeyi ve Đstanbuldaki bireysel hazırlık 
düzeyini tesbit etmeyi hedeflemektedir. 
Çalışma Đstanbul’un farklı deprem risklerine sahip iki ilçesinde ve bu ilçeler içerisinde de 
farklı sosyoekonomik düzeyler (socioeconomic level, SEL) gözönüne alınarak 
gerçekleştirilmiştir.  Çalışma iki bölümden oluşmaktadır.   
Đlk bölümde, Bakırköy ve Beykozda oturan kişiler ile 12 odak grup görüşmesi yapılmış, 
ayrıca uzman, yetkili ve anahtar kişiler ile olmak üzere 11 derinlemesine mülakat 
gerçekleştirilmiştir.  
Đkinci bölümde aynı ilçelerde olmak üzere bir anket çalışması yürütülmüştür. Çalışmanın 
ilk kısmının sonuçları gözönüne alınarak hazırlanan anket formu deneyimli anketörler 
tarafından yüz yüze uygulanmıştır. 
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Çalışmanın kalitatif kısmı göstermiştir ki; odak grup katılımcıları deprem riskini azaltma 
ve hazırlıklı olmaya yönelik önlem alma sürecini tanımlamak için hazırladığımız 
kuramsal çerceve içinde üç farklı davranış şekli göstermektedirler. Đlk ve en sık görülen 
davranış şekli, kuramsal çercevede yer alan ‘farkındalık’ evresi içerisinde ya da bu evre 
tamamlandıktan sonra sürecin sosyal, bireysel yada çevresel faktörlerin etkisi ile 
kesintiye uğramasıdır. Daha az sıklıkta görülen  ikinci davranış şeklinde süreç bir sonraki 
ya da onu takip eden diğer evreler ile devam etmekte ama yine süreç başarı ile 
tamamlanamadan kesintiye uğramaktadır. Sürecin başarı ile tamamlanması grup 
katılımcıları arasında en az sıklıkta görülen davranış şekli olmuştur. 
Çalışmanın kalitatif kısmı, düşük sosyoekonomik durumu; önlemlerin etkisine yönelik 
inanç eksikliğini -örneğin yapısal olmayan ve mikro düzedeki önlemlere yönelik kuşku-; 
çaresizliği; umursamazlık kültürünü; yapı sektörünün tüm aktörlerine güvensizliği; 
çevresel faktörleri -örneğin önceden tahmin edilebilirliğinin henüz zayıf oluşu, olayın ani 
gerçekleşmesi, iki olay arasında hayatın normalleşmesi (Normalisation Bias) gibi-, 
depremlere yönelik risklerin azaltılması ve hazırlıklı olunması için önlem alma 
sürecindeki engeller olarak ortaya koymuştur. Yüksek riskli bir bölgede oturmak; lise ve 
üniversite mezunu olmak; daha önceki depremlerde kurtarma ve yardımlaşma 
çalışmalarına katılarak deprem deneyimi sahibi olmak; sosyal etkileşim ise bu süreçteki 
motive edici faktörlerdir.  
Anket çalışmasının örnekleminin %54’ü sorduğumuz onbir önlemden en az üçünü 
almışlardır, %12’si herhangibir önlem almamıştır. Binanın yapı güvenliği açısından 
kontol ettirilmesi (%51), yatağın yanında el lambası bulundurulması (%49), yüksek 
eşyaların sabitlenmsi (%39), deprem sigortası yaptırmak (%38), aile afet planı hazırlamak 
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(%32) tüm örneklem içinde en sıklıkla alınan beş önlemdir. Fakat, binanın yapı güvenliği 
açısından kontol ettirilmesi ve  deprem sigortası yaptırmanın sıklığı riskli bölgede 
anlamlı olarak daha fazladır (X2: 296.6, p<0.001; X2: 89.34, p<0.001). 
Lojistik regresyon analizi eğitim seviyesinin (olasılıklar oranı, odds ratio, OR: 2.8, güven 
aralığı, confidence interval, CI: 1.8, 4.4) en az üç önlem almış olmayı etkileyen en önemli 
faktör  olduğunu göstermiştir. Bunu sırası ile yüksek riskli bir bölgede oturmak (OR: 2.3, 
CI: 1.6, 3.1), geçmiş depremlerde kurtarma ve yardımlaşma çalışmalarına katılmış olmak 
(OR: 2.0, CI: 1.2, 2.1), yüksek deprem bilgisi skoru (OR: 1.9, CI: 1.4, 2.6), ev sahibi 
olmak (OR: 1.8, CI: 1.3, 2.4), yüksek sosyoekonomik düzeydeki bir mahallede oturmak 
(OR: 1.6, CI: 1.1, 2.3), yüksek eylemi-motive-edici tutum skoru (OR: 1.5, CI: 1.2, 2.1), 
yüksek genel güvenlik skoru (OR: 1.5, CI: 1.1, 2.2) ve genç yaş grubunda olmak (16-34 
yaş, OR: 0.6, CI: 0.4, 0.99)  izlemektedir.  
Önlem alma ile ilgili anlamlı ilişkisi tesbit edilen faktörlere yönelik bireylerin 
durumlarını değiştirmek oldukça zordur. Bu yönde bir değişim politik, sosyal ve 
ekonomik sistemelere bir dizi müdehaleyi gerektirir. Fakat bu faktörler arasında sadece 
deprem bilgisi etkin farkındalık programları gibi daha basit müdehalerle geliştirilebilir. 
Bu yüzden çabalar bireylere etkili bir biçimde deprem bilgisi vermeye yoğunlaşmalıdır.  
Söz konusu programlar riskin kendisine ve sonuçlarına yoğunlaşmak yerine depremler ile 
nasıl başedileceğine dair ve bireylerin varolan riski kişiselleştirmesine yardımcı olacak 
bilgilerin yaygınlaştırılmasına yoğunlaşmalıdır. Ayrıca bu tür programlar bireylerin farklı 
önlemlere, afet yönetiminin aktörlerine, kendi kapasitelerinin önemine yönelik tavırlarını 
değiştirmeyi ve toplumda güvenli yaşam kültürünü oluşturmayı hedefleyen etkinlikleri 
kapsamalıdır. Düşük eğitim seviyesindeki kişiler, yüksek riskli bölgelerde olduğu kadar 
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daha az riskli bölgelerde yaşayanlar, kiracılar, düşük sosyo ekonomik düzeydeki yerleşim 
yerlerinde oturanlar ve gençler bu programların hedef kitlesini oluşturmaktadır. Daha 
önceki depremlerde yardımlaşma ve dayanışma çalışmalarına katılmış olan bireyler 
uygun görev ve sorumluluklar verilerek bu programların topluma ve yerel düzeye   
ulaşmasına yardımcı olabilirler. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to the problem and the public health relevance 
Natural disasters have always affected human health and wellbeing. Despite 
developments in knowledge and technology, their impact has increased in severity in 
recent decades. The contribution of human-made and natural disasters to the global 
burden of disease is expected to climb from twelfth place in 1998 to eighth place in 2020 
(Global Forum Health Research, 2001). The World Meteorological Organization has 
estimated that the impact of natural disasters on the world economy is 50 billion dollars 
annually (PANA, 1999). 
Natural disasters affect communities in various economic and social ways. As well as the 
effects on public services such as water, sewerage and energy, the massive adverse 
impact of natural disasters on the health of populations has also caused them to be 
acknowledged as public health problems (Noji, 1997). 
Public health plays an important role in disaster issues, and not only because of the 
impact of disasters on health. The public health perspective can also contribute to 
preparedness and prevention efforts, as seen in the debate on primary health care and 
prevention versus cure (Loretti, 2000). The United Nations underlined this principle for 
disaster reduction strategies during the last decade with initiatives such as the 
International Decade for Natural Disasters Reduction and the International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction (ISDR), which were intended to move the debate towards activities in 
anticipation of a disaster that also aim to enhance the impact of response and post-disaster 
activities through preparedness programmes. Both nationally and internationally, 
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however, large amounts of money and resources are being allocated for direct response 
activities to disasters. 
 
1.2 The problem and the overall aim of the study 
Unfortunately, not only governments, organizations or institutions but also people at risk 
are not very keen about pre-disaster activities, which involve prevention, mitigation of 
damage and preparedness. In order to cope effectively with disasters the inherent 
difficulties in getting people to take preparatory action need to be overcome. This 
situation highlights the need to understand and describe the process of taking precautions 
and the factors determining it. The aim of this study is, therefore, to investigate the 
process of taking action regarding preparedness for an earthquake and mitigation of its 
effects at individual level and to identify the factors that influence it. 
 
1.3 Specific objectives 
The specific objectives of the study are to; 
i. investigate the process of taking action regarding preparedness for an earthquake 
and mitigation of its effects at individual level; 
 
ii. assess the level of preparedness in the study area for the predicted earthquake; 
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iii. test whether there is a difference regarding the taking of such action at individual 
level between residents of higher- and lower-risk districts and between groups 
with different socioeconomic levels; 
 
iv. identify additional personal, social and environmental factors that are associated 
with taking action to prepare for and mitigate the effects of the predicted 
earthquake. 
 
1.4 Overview of chapters 
Chapter 1 gives general information about the background of the problem and defines the 
problem, the aim of the study and the specific objectives. Chapter 2 consists of a paper 
about the conceptual framework and the current situation in Istanbul regarding activities 
to prepare for an earthquake and mitigate its effects at individual level. 
In order to avoid duplication, Chapter 3 only mentions the study area and the 
methodology very briefly. More information about these issues can be found in the 
relevant parts of Chapters 4 and 6. 
The results of the study are discussed in two parts. The findings of the qualitative data are 
presented in an article and working paper in Part III (Chapters 4 and 5) and the results of 
the quantitative data are presented in another article in Part IV (Chapter 6). 
Chapter 7 is a general discussion of the study, including conclusions and 
recommendations.
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2. Conceptual framework and current situation 
regarding earthquake preparedness in Istanbul  
 
 
Sıdıka Tekeli Yeşil 
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2.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the importance of involving and ensuring the active participation 
of individuals and communities in disaster mitigation and preparedness activities. The 
definition of such activities has been given as: “Preparedness comprises activities 
designed to minimize loss of life and damage, to organize the temporary removal of 
people and property from a threatened location, facilitate timely and effective rescue, 
relief, and rehabilitation, while mitigation comprises measures taken in advance of a 
disaster aimed to decreasing or eliminating its impact on society and environment.” 
(Wisner & Adams, 2002: 13). The key question raised in this paper is: what are the 
factors affecting action regarding preparedness for an earthquake and mitigation of 
earthquake damage at the individual level in Istanbul?  
After brief information about the process of taking action regarding preparedness for and 
mitigation of a disaster, the megacity of Istanbul will be reviewed as an example, looking 
at the factors affecting the way the residents undertake such activities. In conclusion, 
some recommendations will be put forward. 
The impact of natural hazards has increased in severity in recent decades due to the 
growing vulnerability1 of populations through, inter alia, rapid population growth, 
urbanization, environmental degradation, poverty and social inequalities (Arnold, 2002; 
Brauch, 2005; Wisner & Adams, 2002). It is, therefore, becoming vital that pre-disaster 
activities should be undertaken at both community and individual levels to mitigate the 
                                                 
1
 The term “vulnerability” explains “the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that 
influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard” 
(Wisner et al., 2004: 11) and “a function of susceptibility (the factors that allow a hazard to cause a 
disaster) and resilience (the ability to withstand the damage caused by emergencies and disasters and then 
to recover)” (Wisner & Adams, 2002: 13). 
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consequences of disasters and sustain the population’s resilience. To be effective and 
successful, efforts to improve mitigation and preparedness activities at governmental, 
sectoral and institutional levels should be supported by corresponding efforts at the 
community and individual levels. For example, land-use strategies or the application of 
building codes do not mean much if they are not observed (as often happens), and early 
warning systems are useless if the people do not know what to do or are unprepared for 
such situations. 
The opposite is also true: governments should support individual and community disaster 
preparation efforts. For example, first aid training could be provided for volunteers and 
cheap credits given to home-owners to strengthen the construction of their homes. This is 
why disaster risk reduction was described in the context of the ISDR as a shared 
responsibility between governments, communities and individuals (ISDR 2004). 
Additionally, in many disasters the victims and local people are the first to respond, 
especially where search and rescue activities are concerned. They can also be isolated or 
unreachable in the early phases of disasters and thus have no option but to cope with the 
situation by themselves. Their involvement and active participation in any kind of 
mitigation and preparedness activities are, therefore, essential for coping successfully 
with natural disasters. 
Getting the cooperation of individuals and communities is, however, more easily said 
than done. Studies in various countries with different economic and social backgrounds 
have shown that people tend to be uninterested in and unwilling to take action for 
preparedness and to reduce the risks (Anderson-Berry, 2003; Dedeoğlu, 2005; Fişek, 
Yeniçeri, Müderrisoğlu, & Özkarar, 2003; Hurnen & McClure, 1997; Inelmen, Işeri-Say, 
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& Kabasakal, 2004; Kleindorfer & Kunreuther, 1999; Larsson & Enander, 1997; Paton, 
2003; Shaw, Shiwaku, Kobayashi, & Kobayashi, 2004). Many social, economic, personal 
and environmental factors underlie this situation. Freedom from the impact of hazards 
can only be achieved when people who are vulnerable to such hazards and disasters 
(which are often intensified by associated societal threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and 
risks) receive better warning of them and are prepared and protected against their impact 
(Brauch, 2005). While many studies focus on understanding the susceptibilities of 
populations, an equal understanding of the characteristics of resilience in a population is 
also important in maintaining this freedom and mitigating the consequences of hazards. 
 
2.2 Factors affecting individual preparedness 
Figure 2.1 presents a conceptual framework we drew up to show the process of taking 
precautions at individual level. This framework is based on theories and models which 
have often been used in epidemiological studies to understand risky and protective health 
behaviour and activities (Health Belief Model (Becker, 1974; Schwarzer, 1991; Strecher 
& Rosenstock, 1997); Theory of Reasoned Action and Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(Ajzen and Fishbein, (1991; 1980); and Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers, (1975), 
which was inspired by DeJoy’s model for Workplace Self-protective Behaviour (1996)). 
These models and theories have been applied to a wide range of preventive and lifestyle 
behaviour (e.g. vaccination, smoking, use of seatbelts, safe sex practices and exercise) 
(DeJoy, 1996) and each of them makes some contribution to understanding the type of 
behaviour which has similarities with behaviour regarding disaster preparedness. 
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Figure 2.1 Conceptual framework for the process of taking action regarding disaster 
mitigation and preparedness 
 
In summary, this framework presents a five-stage process and shows that where there is a 
risk of hazard, awareness of this risk is the pre-requisite of taking action. Risk of hazard 
is the risk of a hazard occurring and involves the type, severity, frequency and impact of 
it. Risk awareness includes perception and knowledge of the risk, its consequences and 
how to cope with it, which are determined by the availability of reliable and accessible 
information. These factors have an important influence on the process of taking action to 
prepare for disasters and mitigate their effects (Dedeoğlu, 2005; Johnston, Bebbington, 
Lai, Houghton, & Paton, 1999; Kasapoğlu & Ecevit, 2001; Mileti & Fitzpatrick, 1992; 
Ronan, Johnston, Daly, & Fairley, 2001; Weinstein & Sandman, 1992). Although they 
present high correlations with taking such action, these factors do not, however, 
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automatically guarantee better preparedness at the individual level or mitigation of the 
effects of disasters (Chan, 1995; Johnston et al., 1999; Paton, 2003). 
The next stage is the evaluation of the costs and benefits of the measures. When deciding 
whether to prepare for hazards, a person weighs the physical, psychological and 
economic costs of taking action against the probable benefits to life and property in the 
future, and evaluates whether the input can bring greater and/or similar benefits if 
invested in another area – much as economists do when considering the opportunity cost 
of an intervention or an investment. According to the results of this evaluation, the 
sequence might continue with a person’s attitudes towards and intentions regarding 
taking action for mitigation and preparedness, followed by the action taken. Sometimes, 
as a consequence of a disaster or some other development, the action concerned may be 
followed by evaluation applied to all or some of the stages. 
The process of taking action cannot be considered only in the context of hazard. A series 
of social, personal and environmental factors is also crucial in this process. This is why 
intervening factors have been included in the framework. Each stage and the transition 
phases can be positively or negatively influenced by intervening personal, social or 
environmental factors. Elements of these factors are as follows:  
a) personal factors: previous experience with a disaster (Anderson-Berry, 2003; 
Johnston et al., 1999; Weinstein, 1989); availability of resources, such as time, 
skill and financial and physical resources (Chan, 1995; Mamun, 1996); 
demographic characteristics such as age, cohabitation, the presence of a child in 
the household, type of residence (e.g. own/rent) (Larsson & Enander, 1997); 
unrealistic optimism (Burger & Palmer, 1992; Weinstein, 1989); denial (Lehman 
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& Taylor, 1987); personal beliefs such as outcome expectancy including 
perceptions of whether individual action will effectively mitigate or reduce a 
problem (Lindell & Whitney, 2000; Rohrmann, 2000) and perception of hazards 
as controllable or uncontrollable (Rohrmann, 2000; Slovic, Fischhoff, & 
Lichtenstein, 2001); fatalism, helplessness (Mamun, 1996); perceived dread of the 
hazard (Renn, Wiliams, Kasperson, Kasperson, & Slovic, 1992); transfer of 
responsibility to others (e.g. state, government or local authorities) (Inelmen et al., 
2004; Johnston & Benton, 1998; Paton, 2003); and world views (Slovic, 2001); 
b) social factors: socioeconomic status, social class (Burningham, Fielding, & 
Thrush, 2008); social network (Anderson-Berry, 2003; Paton, Millar, & Johnston, 
2001); sense of community (Paton, 2003); social support and interaction (Mileti & 
Fitzpatrick, 1992); cultural phenomena (Bontempo, Bottom, & Weber, 1997; 
Kasapoğlu & Ecevit, 2001); lack of trust (Inelmen et al., 2004); and media 
coverage (Renn et al., 1992); 
c) environmental factors: these are mainly related to the phenomenon: frequency of 
occurrence; normalisation bias (Becker, Smith, Johnston, & Munro, 2001; Paton, 
2003); imaginability of and potential for catastrophe (Slovic et al., 2001); 
characteristics and impact of the hazard agent such as speed of onset, scope and 
duration of impact (Lindell, 1994); and location (Lindell & Prater, 2000). 
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2.3 Megacities and vulnerability of their residents in relation to natural 
disasters 
The global urban population was 46.7% of the total world population in 2000 and is 
estimated to rise to 59.9% in 2030 (UN, 2006, 2007). In the modern world, urban areas 
are at the highest risk of disasters since those are places where nearly all the factors that 
make populations more vulnerable are seen or experienced. These factors include high 
population concentration and densities, in some cases uncontrolled spatial expansion and 
severe infrastructural deficits, high concentration of industrial production, insufficient 
housing provision, ecological degradation, in some cases extreme socioeconomic 
disparities, and high immigration rates (Kraas, 2003/4). Furthermore, the most crowded 
cities of the world are located in areas that are at extremely high risk of natural disasters 
(ISDR, 2004). As more people move each year to urban areas, it is clear that special 
attention should be given to the development of projects covering urban preparedness. 
Disasters in urban settlements can also have positive consequences for awareness. 
Özerdem and Barakat (2000) mentioned the urban–rural dichotomy when pointing out 
that even though there have been many earthquakes in Turkey2, it was only after the 1999 
earthquake that earthquake safety and disaster management began to be taken seriously 
due to the large number of urban areas affected and because the victims were mainly 
urban dwellers. 
An investigation into earthquake preparedness in Istanbul would benefit other cities, even 
for other types of disaster, since megacities have more in common with each other than 
                                                 
2
 From 1902 up to and excluding the two earthquakes in 1999 earthquakes caused 129 events in Turkey that 
produced damage such as the loss of housing stock. Of these, 92 resulted in fatalities ranging from 1 to 
3959 deaths (http://angora.deprem.gov.tr/raporen.htm, 7 February 2008).  
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with their own hinterlands (Kraas, 2003/4). In addition, although all hazard events are 
unique and their consequences may differ depending on many factors, the similarities in 
the human response to hazards means that the results could also have general relevance 
for other hazards. The suggestion here is not, of course, to carbon copy the application of 
the methods and findings to all cities and all types of natural hazard, but to bear in mind 
the common aspects in human response and living circumstances. 
 
2.4 The case of Istanbul 
The social, demographic and economic characteristics of Istanbul can be summarized 
briefly as follows. The 2007 general census showed that 12,573,836 people were living in 
Istanbul; the population density was 2,420 people per km²; 89% of the people were living 
in urban areas; and 70% of the population was aged between 15 and 64 years.3 The 
annual population growth rate was 3.3% and the unemployment rate was 12.7% (IBB, 
2001). The high population growth rate in Istanbul is mostly due to migration of low-
income groups from other parts of Turkey looking for work. This situation produces 
many problems which increase the vulnerability of the population, such as overcrowding, 
inadequate infrastructure and services, environmental degradation and informal 
settlements (the gecekondu, which are makeshift one-storey houses built illegally on 
public land on the outskirts of the city). Since gecekondus are constructed without regard 
to building codes and regulations, the structures are weak and susceptible to hazards. 
Unfortunately one fifth of the Istanbul population lives in the gecekondu (Keleş & Geray, 
                                                 
3
 Türkiye Đstatistik Kurumu: Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK) (http://www.turkstat. gov.tr, 7 February 
2008).  
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1995). There are approximately 2,714,462 buildings in Istanbul, of which only 32% are 
insured against earthquake risk (DASK, 2008), even though such insurance has been 
compulsory since the end of 1999. 
On 17 August and 12 November 1999, the Marmara region, where Istanbul is located, 
was shaken by two severe earthquakes, with magnitudes of 7.4 and 7.2, respectively, on 
the Richter scale which cost nearly 18,000 lives and did severe damage to buildings, 
economic life and infrastructure (T.C. Sayıştay Başkanlığı, 2002/3). Some authors have 
estimated that there is a 62% probability (± 15%) of an earthquake of a magnitude of 
approximately 7 on the Richter scale before 2030 in the vicinity of Istanbul (Parsons, 
Toda, Stein, Barka, & Dieterich, 2000). During the 1999 earthquakes Istanbul, was not 
affected as badly as other cities in the Marmara region (except the Avcılar district), 
mainly due to the distance from the epicentres. 
The province of Istanbul consists of 1 metropolitan municipality and 32 district 
municipalities. Of the latter, 13 are located in the first-degree (highest) earthquake risk 
zone, 17 located in the second-degree earthquake risk zone, 2 are in the third-degree 
earthquake risk zone, and only 2 sub-districts (non-urban) are in the fourth-degree 
earthquake risk zone (AYM, 2005). 
 
2.5 Individual preparedness in Istanbul 
Fortunately, increasing numbers of studies about human response to hazards and 
individual and community preparedness are being undertaken as more scientists and 
institutions in different disciplines have begun to deal with these issues. There is still, 
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however, a limited number of studies both at national and international levels. The 
following section offers findings from a few studies conducted in Istanbul regarding 
individual and community preparedness. 
When the features presented in this section are considered in the context of a predicted 
earthquake, it can be easily understood how severe the consequences would be. As well 
as other socioeconomic consequences, one scenario for a predicted earthquake expects 
that there would be 30,000–40,000 casualties and more than 120,000 injured people 
needing hospitalization (BU, 2003). The 1999 earthquake in Turkey and experience in the 
rest of the world have shown that most minor and medium injuries are caused by non-
structural elements and building contents, such as glass and furniture (Noji, 1997; Petal, 
2000). Furthermore, in previous experiences almost all victims were either rescued by 
local people (neighbours, family members) or saved themselves (Dedeoğlu, Hakan, & 
Kayıhan, 2000; WHO, 1999). These two findings clearly highlight that individual 
preparedness plays a critical role and that there are many things that individuals and the 
community can do to prevent or mitigate the consequences of earthquakes, even with 
small-scale investments. Although many promising mitigation and preparedness 
programmes have been conducted since the 1999 earthquakes, the situation in Istanbul 
regarding earthquake preparedness at individual and community level is not adequate. 
The level of awareness about the predicted earthquake among the inhabitants of Istanbul 
is quite high. In a study by Fişek and colleagues (2003), respondents presented a realistic 
appraisal of the risk they faced in terms of the security of their zones4. In the same study, 
                                                 
4
 Information on high-risk districts considering earthquake zones or the site-dependent intensity distribution 
of a scenario earthquake is provided by relevant national government and municipal departments and 
universities and is available to the public. For detailed information about risk zones or high-risk areas, refer 
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75% of the respondents gave relevant answers to the question of what an earthquake was 
and 62% saw construction as the real source of danger. Many inhabitants of Istanbul had 
experienced earthquakes before (Bay, 2006; IBB, 2002) and had a high perception of the 
risk of a predicted earthquake. Studies conducted in different districts of Istanbul have 
shown that over 50% of the respondents perceived a high risk of a predicted earthquake, 
ranging from 68.8% (Kalaça, Aytekin, & Çalı, 2007); 52.5% (Işeri Say, Đnelmen, & 
Kabasakal, 2005); 58.3 % (IBB, 2002) to 58.1%5 (T.C. Başbakanlık PUB, 2005). 
However, risk perception declines when the question is referred from the city to the 
individual level (Işeri Say et al., 2005). In a study by Bay Aytekin (2006), 26% of the 
respondents thought that nothing could be done on an individual level against 
earthquakes. Structural safety was the most commonly mentioned measure (67%) as a 
way to mitigate the damage from an earthquake among the respondents to the study by 
Fişek and colleagues (2003). Notwithstanding people’s high perception of risk, very few 
preparedness or mitigation activities were being undertaken (Fişek et al., 2003; IBB, 
2002; Inelmen et al., 2004; Kalaça et al., 2007): more than 10% of the respondents had 
not taken any kind of preparedness and/or mitigation measures. According to Kalaça and 
colleagues (2007) and Işeri Say and colleagues (2005), 12.9 % and 16.7%, respectively, 
of the respondents had taken no measures regarding earthquake preparedness, even 
though earthquakes were often a theme of daily conversation (IBB, 2002; T.C. 
Başbakanlık PUB, 2005). 
                                                                                                                                                 
to Afet Işleri Genel Müdürlüğü Deprem Araştırma Dairesi/General Directorate of Disaster Affairs, 
Earthquake Research Department (http://www.deprem.gov.tr) or Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality 
(http://www.ibb.gov.tr/trTR/SubSites/IstanbulVeDeprem/) and B.U., 2003: Earthquake Risk Assessment 
for the Istanbul Metropolitan Area Final Report. 
5
 Risk perception for a destructive earthquake in Istanbul in two to five years or later was 58.1%, and 
within the coming three months or in a year was 13.5%. 
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The most common mitigation and preparedness activities undertaken were: learning how 
to behave during an earthquake; having an earthquake bag/kit; fixing high furniture and 
equipment; and obtaining earthquake insurance (Fişek et al., 2003; IBB, 2002; Kalaça et 
al., 2007). 
 
2.6 Factors affecting individuals in taking mitigation and preparedness 
action in Istanbul 
The 1999 Marmara earthquakes, which killed over 18,000 people, showed the importance 
of action to prepare for an earthquake in the city of Istanbul. The need to mitigate damage 
and for preparedness activities was only acknowledged after these deadly earthquakes 
(Balamir, 2001; Karancı & Akşit, 2000; Tekeli-Yeşil, Tanner, Braun-Fahrlaender, & 
Dedeoğlu, 2007). The findings of various studies showed that the following are important 
factors in undertaking mitigation and preparedness activities. 
1) Socioeconomic level: two studies (Fişek et al., 2003; Kalaça et al., 2007) showed that 
respondents with a high income or living in high socioeconomic level districts had a 
significantly higher score of completed precautions or had taken more precautions than 
other groups. 
2) Educational level: the study of Bay Aytekin (2006) showed that a higher educational 
level had a significant influence on action-stimulating attitudes towards preparedness, as 
well as on taking more precautions. 
3) Area of residence: one study (Kalaça et al., 2007) showed that the citizens of Istanbul 
gave a realistic appraisal of the risk they faced in terms of the security of their zones, 
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corresponding to the finding that respondents living in higher-risk areas had taken more 
precautions. 
4) High perception of risk, especially when the risk is perceived as a threat to the person 
or the family (Kalaça et al., 2007). However, a high perception of risk was not followed 
by action among the respondents to another study (Fişek et al., 2003). 
5) Trust: two studies (Öncüler, 2002; T.C. Başbakanlık PUB, 2005) of individuals’ 
decision-making regarding retrofitting buildings against earthquakes showed that trust (in 
the institutions that plan, apply and control retrofitting projects) was an important 
determinant for decision-making in favour of mitigation of damage. Another study 
(Green, 2008) discussed the distrust of the construction process, especially among 
residents of gecekondu districts. She argued that additional to the root causes of 
unauthorised housing (poverty, macro-economic instability, urban migration and 
hierarchical social relationships), this distrust promotes unauthorised, self-built 
construction because these people perceived self-built houses as more, rather than less 
earthquake-resistant, as they are built by themselves and not by someone interested in 
profit. Inelmen and colleagues (2004) discussed the lack of trust in various information 
sources; as well as other studies (IBB, 2002), their study showed that scientists and 
university institutions were the most trusted sources to provide information about 
earthquakes. 
6) Experience of an earthquake: Kalaça et al (Kalaça et al., 2007) found that experience 
of a high-magnitude earthquake, losing someone in the close circle and participating in 
solidarity activities during the 1999 earthquakes were significant factors. 
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7) Fatalism: even though almost all the studies mentioned wrote about the existence of 
fatalism, most of them did not find it to be a significant factor in taking precautions. 
However, Inelmen and his colleagues (Inelmen et al., 2004) found it to be a significant 
factor for not joining disaster-preparedness organisations. 
Additionally, group dynamics in blocks of flats (T.C. Başbakanlık PUB, 2005) and home 
ownership (Fişek et al., 2003; Kalaça et al., 2007) were mentioned as important factors in 
taking decisions in favour of mitigation and preparedness measures. Öncüler’s (2002) 
research showed that average willingness to pay for earthquake mitigation measures 
increased when a building nearby had been fitted, and that the amount of reduction in 
damage due to taking mitigation measures was another factor in decision-making. 
Respondents were more likely to pay for a mitigation activity that offered “zero damage”. 
Finally, action-stimulating attitudes towards taking mitigation and preparedness measures 
did not show a straightforward relationship with actually taking such measures (Fişek et 
al., 2003). 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
The impacts of hazards are not just geological, meteorological or hydrological events; 
they do not only leave economic damage or casualties behind them; and disaster 
management is not just a technical matter. There are human and social issues relating to 
hazards which must also be well understood. Disasters cannot be managed only with 
technical measures such as an increase in the number of search and rescue personnel and 
ambulances. As well as other measures, a wise and an effective measure is to teach 
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communities and individuals about the pre- and post-disaster stages and maintain their 
active participation in mitigation and preparedness activities (Tekeli-Yeşil, 2007). 
Since megacities are seen as hotspots of risk6, special attention should be paid to them. 
As well as understanding their vulnerable aspects, it is important to determine and use the 
opportunities they provide. 
As noted in sections 2.5 and 2.6 above, an earthquake is expected in the near future in 
Istanbul with an impact exceeding that of the earthquakes in 1999. According to the 
conceptual framework presented in section 2.2 above, this means that there is a risk of an 
earthquake occurring with a severe impact. Depending on the studies mentioned the 
inhabitants of the city know that there is such a risk and thus have a high risk perception 
and moderate awareness. If individuals personalize the actual risk, this high perception 
can lead them to make better preparations for the hazard; otherwise it is not a guarantee 
for critical earthquake awareness or for further activities. However, even if they are 
aware, they make little progress towards taking action. The studies presented in this paper 
show that there is some awareness in the community but not enough to trigger protective 
practices. Even though there is limited information about evaluation of the physical, 
psychological and economic costs and benefits of taking individual action, the role of 
home ownership in taking action might be interpreted as homeowners seeing more 
benefit in taking measures to mitigate any damage. The expected amount of reduction in 
damage resulting from mitigation measures is also an important factor at this stage. 
Although the situation about attitudes towards taking mitigation and preparedness 
measures is optimistic, studies show that they do not necessarily lead to action. 
                                                 
6
 See the press release Megacities, mega hot spots of 31 July 2007 from the Institute for Environment and 
Human Security of the United Nations University in Bonn (http://www.ehs.unu.edu/article:365) . 
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Possible factors responsible for the disruption between awareness and the following 
stages are the intervening personal, social and environmental factors in the framework. 
Findings from the studies mentioned above and from other studies conducted in other 
parts of Turkey (Dedeoğlu, 2005; Kasapoğlu & Ecevit, 2001) as well as studies from 
around the world (Chan, 1995; Larsson & Enander, 1997; Lindell & Prater, 2000) 
indicate that socioeconomic and educational levels play a significant role in individual 
preparedness and influence almost all stages of the process. 
Living in a high-risk area and experience with a high-magnitude earthquake seem to be 
motivating intervening factors. Past experience about disasters can be a starting point for 
many people, especially when they have had direct experience such as participating in 
rescue or solidarity activities after the event. Lack of trust in the construction sector and 
information sources acts as a hindrance in taking precautions. Considering the high level 
of trust in scientists and university institutions, they can be seen as potential actors to 
transmit the appropriate messages of mitigation and preparedness programmes. Findings 
about group dynamics and the positive effect of a nearby building being strengthened 
indicate the role of social interaction, which can also be helpful in persuading people to 
adopt precautions. Fatalism does not seem to play as important a role in disaster 
preparation as might be expected, although this needs further explanation. 
Considering the literature mentioned in section 2.2 above, we can assume that there 
should be additional important factors instrumental in the gap between awareness and 
action among the population of Istanbul. Other than location (living in a high-risk area), 
there is no information about environmental factors such as suddenness of onset, 
normalisation bias or poor predictability. It is also known that personal beliefs and 
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perceptions, such as outcome expectancy regarding the measures and perceptions of the 
hazard as controllable or not are also important factors that influence the process of 
taking action, although there is limited information on personal factors. Furthermore, 
there could be additional social factors related to the characteristics of Istanbul or cultural 
phenomena in the community. These points need further investigation.   
In conclusion, the involvement and active participation of individuals in any kind of 
preparedness and mitigation activities are vital for coping successfully with natural 
disasters. Preparations for reducing possible damage from hazards are extremely 
important in better disaster management. Individual preparedness for earthquakes and 
hazards is, however, a complex process, which is determined by many social, economic, 
environmental and personal factors. Thus it is important for disaster managers to identify 
barriers and motivations particular to their communities in order to communicate the risk 
successfully. 
Finally, risk reduction is a community-based activity which involves participation, power 
sharing, legislation, organization and development planning. These factors mean that not 
much preparation can be expected in poor, powerless or marginal societies (Dedeoğlu, 
2006). That is why preparing for disasters cannot be left to the individual alone: it is the 
duty of governments to strengthen the population’s resilience and coping mechanisms. 
Thus for cities to be safer, individual activities regarding earthquake preparedness or 
other hazards should be supported by and integrated into governmental, institutional and 
communal preparedness. In this context, disaster risk reduction has to be seen as a 
political, economic and social issue, since disasters can only be coped with effectively 
when disaster management is integrated into social and economic development. 
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3. Study area and methodology 
 
 
3.1 Study area 
 
Turkey is divided into seven geographical regions (Marmara, Aegean, Black Sea, 
Mediterranean, Central, Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia). The Marmara region in the 
north-west surrounds the Marmara Sea and includes the city of Istanbul. A narrow strip 
of water, the Bosphorus, separates the continents of Asia and Europe and divides the city 
of Istanbul (Figures 3.1 and 3.2) 
 
Figure 3.1 Geological regions of Turkey 
Source: http:\\harita.turkcebilgi.com 
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Figure 3.2 Marmara region 
Source: www.turkeyarena.com 
 
Main sociodemographic features of Istanbul were noted in section 2.4 above. In addition 
to these features, Istanbul is important to the economy of Turkey, with 21.3% of gross 
domestic product (IBB, 2001) – the second highest in the country – and approximately 
half of the largest industrial companies. However, it also has the highest income 
inequality (Sönmez, 1996). The high economic performance is one of the reasons for the 
population growth in this region: a considerable proportion of the residents of Istanbul 
are immigrants from all over rural Turkey. According to the results of the 2000 census, 
62% of the population was not born in the city (DIE, 2002). Istanbul is also an important 
place in the history not only of Turkey, but also of the world, and there are many 
objects/sites of world inheritance. 
Turkey is a land of earthquakes: nearly 96% of the country can be described as, in 
varying degrees, at seismic risks (Figure 3.3). Of this large earthquake zone, 66% 
consists of active fault systems, meaning that 70% of the country’s population, including 
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the 11 provinces with populations of over 1 million and 75% of the country’s industrial 
establishments, can be struck by an earthquake at any time (TBMM, 1999). 
 
Figure 3.3 Earthquake zones of Turkey 
Source: Afet Işleri Genel Müdürlüğü Deprem Araştırma Dairesi/General Directorate of 
Disaster Affairs, Earthquake Research Department http://www.deprem.gov.tr 
(DERECE means degree; il merkezi, province centre; il sınırı, province boundaries) 
The Marmara region is one of the most seismically active regions in the eastern 
Mediterranean (BU, 2003), and the Northern Anatolian Fault, which traverses the 
Marmara region, is one of the most seismically active faults in the world (Demirtaş & 
Yılmaz, 2004). 
On Tuesday 17 August 1999 at 03.02 a severe earthquake with a magnitude of 7.4 on the 
Richter scale hit this region. The epicentre of the earthquake was near the town of Gölcük 
(Nurlu & et al., 1999). It lasted more than 45 seconds and affected the whole Marmara 
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region, surrounding cities such as Düzce, Bolu, Zonguldak, which are located to the east 
of the Northern Anatolian Fault, and Eskişehir (ITU, 1999). The earthquake was followed 
by more than 1000 aftershocks, some as high as 5.5-6.0 on the Richter scale (DAD, 
2004). 
Nearly three months later, on 12 November 1999 at 18.56 another earthquake with a 
magnitude of 7.2 on the Richter scale hit the town of Düzce not far from Istanbul. The 
epicentre of the earthquake was eight kilometres away in Düzce province (Nurlu & et al., 
1999), so that it affected nearly the same region as the previous earthquake. This 
earthquake was also followed by many aftershocks. 
Istanbul was not directly affected by these two earthquakes except in the Avcılar district. 
Due to its proximity and the availability of technical and logistical supplies and 
manpower, Istanbul could be of great assistance to the affected cities nearby. 
The seismic threat to Istanbul has been heightened by these two earthquakes. As 
mentioned above, scientists forecast that in the near future a major earthquake could 
occur with a 62% probability (± 15%) of a magnitude of approximately 7 on the Richter 
scale in the vicinity of Istanbul. 
According to this scenario, a total of about 35,000–40,000 buildings in Istanbul (about 
5% of the total building stock) would be damaged beyond repair (complete damage). 
Most of the casualties would be expected in this damage group, especially in a subset 
where the collapse of buildings would be of the worst “pancake” form. The number of 
deaths would vary from 30,000 to 40,000; approximately 120,000 people would need 
hospitalization and between 430,000 and 600,000 households would be in need of shelter 
following the earthquake (BU, 2003). 
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As mentioned in section 2.4, the districts of Istanbul are located in different earthquake 
zones and, according to risk assessments, the intensity distribution of the predicted 
earthquake would vary from district to district (Figure 3. 4 and 4.2). Based on this site-
dependent intensity distribution, we selected the districts of Bakırköy and Beykoz as 
research sites. Bakırköy is expected to be one of the districts experiencing the highest 
intensity (9.0–9.5) and Beykoz to be among the districts experiencing the lowest intensity 
(5.5–6.0). 
 
Figure 3.4 Earthquake zones of Istanbul 
Source: Afet Işleri Genel Müdürlüğü Deprem Araştırma Dairesi/General Directorate of 
Disaster Affairs, Earthquake Research Department http://www.deprem.gov.tr 
Bakırköy: Bakırköy is located beside the Marmara Sea, on the west (European) side of 
Istanbul, with a 35 km2 surface area and a population of 208,233 (DIE, 2002) (Figure 
3.5). It is one of the few districts where the population has fallen. With the Atatürk 
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airport, Ataköy marina, many industrial establishments and shopping malls, Bakırköy, is 
one of the most socially and economically developed districts of the city. 
The neighbourhood of Osmaniye in Bakırköy was the third gecekondu area to be 
established in Istanbul’s recent history due to the industrial establishments in this area 
(Sönmez, 1996). However, the recent trend towards moving industry outside the centre of 
the city combined with the economic value of this land has led to the gecekondus being 
replaced with regular buildings in recent years. Compared with other districts in Istanbul, 
other neighbourhoods in Bakırköy have quite regular buildings and planned settlements. 
 
Figure 3.5 Location of Bakirköy 
Source: http://mapsof.net 
Beykoz: Beykoz is 435 km2 in area and is located along the north-eastern (Asian) side of 
the Bosphorus (Figure 6). As a water basin with springs and forest, It is one of the least 
densely populated districts in Istanbul with a population of 217 316 in 2000 (DIE, 2002). 
It has been a popular district among immigrants and the population includes a range of 
socioeconomic levels. Along the Bosphorus, in the lower parts of the district, there are 
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older settlements with marvellous traditional timber architecture. Beside these old 
settlements, Beykoz was the first gecekondu area in 1940s on the Asian side of Istanbul 
(Sönmez, 1996). It is still dominated by the unplanned settlements and gecekondus, but 
owing to its low risk of earthquake it has become popular in recent years among high-
income groups and many gated communities are being developed for the upper classes. 
 
Figure 3.6 Location of Beykoz 
Source: http://mapsof.net 
 
3.2 Methodology  
The methods used in disaster medical/health research have always presented a problem 
(Quarantelli, 2001), mainly because of two issues: firstly the history of such research, 
which is not very old and needs to be developed, and secondly the nature of disasters 
(Stallings, 2002; Sundness & Birnbaum, 2003). Although some natural disasters are to a 
certain extent predictable, many are not, but all strike more or less unexpectedly. 
Furthermore, disasters may be caused by a variety of events that are never exactly the 
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same and that involve different geographical areas, populations and cultures (Sundness & 
Birnbaum, 2003). In acknowledgment of these difficulties, the techniques that are 
commonly used in social sciences are now being incorporated into disaster 
medicine/health research. Following this approach, a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods has been used in this study to examine the research questions. Focus 
group discussions (FGDs) and interviews constituted the first (qualitative) part of the 
research and a survey constituted the second (quantitative) part. 
In the high- and low-risk areas 12 FGDs and 11 in-depth interviews were conducted and 
a total of 1123 people were interviewed. Detailed information about the data collection 
process and the methodology of the FGDs and in-depth interviews is set out in section 4.5 
below, and of the survey in section 6.2. 
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PART III 
RESULTS of the QUALITATIVE PART of the STUDY 
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Part III has two chapters. The first (Chapter 4) is a paper accepted for publication in the 
journal Disasters containing the main findings of the qualitative study, which indicated 
that in the context of the framework presented above, the study subjects exhibited three 
different patterns in the process of taking mitigation and preparedness measures. Factors 
that inhibit individuals from taking action are outcome expectancy, helplessness, low 
socioeconomic level, culture of negligence, lack of trust, onset time–poor predictability 
and normalisation bias, while the factors promoting action are location, direct personal 
experience, higher education level and social interaction. Drawing on these findings, the 
paper provides key points for better communication relating to disasters including, but 
not limited to, whom to mobilise to reach target populations, such as individuals with 
direct experience of an earthquake. 
In Chapter 4 it is not possible to mention all the issues that emerged during the FGDs and 
in-depth interviews, thus only the issues that were given the most weight in the 
discussions and interviews are discussed. However, some additional intervening factors 
that might also influence the process of taking action regarding earthquake mitigation of 
damage and preparedness at individual level were identified during the analysis. These 
factors were either less frequently mentioned or mainly mentioned as “others” 
experiences or thoughts, but they are important in understanding the factors affecting the 
way the population undertake mitigation and preparedness activities. They are presented 
in Chapter 5, where the roles of unrealistic optimism, transfer of responsibility to others, 
tenure (own/rent) and group dynamics in taking mitigation and preparedness action at 
individual level will be discussed. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Rapid population growth, urbanisation, environmental degradation, poverty and social 
inequalities pave the way for the growing impact of natural hazards in our modern world. 
Global trends in natural hazards show that although there has been a decrease in fatalities, 
the number of people affected and the estimated damage from disasters have increased 
since the middle of the 20th century7. This has led to some changes in disaster 
management practice. In recent years, risk reduction (prevention of the hazard’s impact, 
mitigation of the damage and preparedness for the hazard) has gained the most attention. 
It has been acknowledged that risk reduction comprises a continuous series of tasks 
carried out by the social, economic, governmental and professional sectors and is not, or 
should not be, the preserve of experts in various fields. This is why it was described in 
the context of the ISDR as a shared responsibility between governments, communities 
and individuals (ISDR, 2004). Corresponding to the ISDR definitions, studies and 
experience indicate that the active participation of individuals and the community is 
essential for the success of any kind of disaster management activity (Burningham et al., 
2008). Unfortunately there are few examples of good practice. One side of the coin shows 
that a top-down approach is still most common in disaster/risk management, but the other 
side shows that people are often uninterested in and unwilling to take action for 
preparedness and to reduce risks (Dedeoğlu, 2006; Lehman & Taylor, 1987). 
This paper focuses on that second side of the coin, with the overall aim of investigating 
the process of taking action for mitigation of damage from and preparedness for an 
earthquake at individual level in Istanbul, where scientists predict that there will be a 
                                                 
7
 http://www.emdat.be/Database/Trends/trends.html (27.02.08). 
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major earthquake in the near future (Parsons et al., 2000). The specific aim of the study 
was to identify the factors that encourage or inhibit individuals in this process. This paper 
draws on the first part of an ongoing study in Istanbul. 
 
4.2 Background 
Many studies in various countries with different economic and social profiles have 
investigated the factors that motivate or hinder individuals to take precautions for 
hazards. Despite the different nature of the countries and of the hazards investigated, 
certain characteristics related to human responses to hazards seem to be shared. 
Socioeconomic and educational levels, experience of hazards and demographic 
characteristics seem to be common factors identified by various studies in this field 
  64 
Table 4.1 Selected literature on individual hazard preparedness and factors affecting the taking of action to mitigate and 
prepare for hazards 
Type of 
hazard 
Country/city Factors Reference Comments 
Flood England & 
Wales 
• Social class 
• Personal experience of the flood 
• Length of time in residence 
• Denial/rejection of ‘at risk’ status 
• Invisibility of the risk 
Burningham et al. 
(2008) 
The paper mainly focused on 
awareness. 
Earthquake Turkey/Istanbul • Location  
• Demographic characteristics (age, tenure)  
• Educational level of individuals 
• Risk perception 
• Economic level  
• Earthquake experience 
• Direct experience  
Kalaça et al. 
(2007) 
Economic level (known 
socioeconomic level of the 
neighbourhood where respondents 
live). 
Earthquake Turkey/Antalya • Age (only for awareness) 
• Earthquake experience 
• Educational level of individuals 
• Economic level of individuals 
Dedeoğlu (2006) Fatalism was not a major factor for 
action. 
Earthquake Turkey/Istanbul • Not having capacities  
• Unfamiliarity with the community-based organisation  
• Lack of time  
• Fatalism 
• Lack of trust 
Inelmen et al. 
(2004) 
Participation in a relevant local 
community-based organization was 
investigated in the study. 
Cyclone Australia/Cairns • Risk perception 
• Direct personal experience of a cyclone 
• Hazard awareness education 
Anderson-Berry 
(2003) 
 
Earthquake Turkey/Istanbul • Educational level of individuals 
• Economic level of individuals (income) 
• Gender (only for risk perception) 
Fişek et al. (2002) Risk perception and attitudes do not 
show a straightforward relationship 
with action. 
Earthquake USA/southern 
California and 
western 
Washington 
• Location  
• Demographic characteristics 
• Earthquake experience 
• Hazard intrusiveness  
Lindell & Prater 
(2000) 
All stated factors cause hazard 
adjustments within a causal chain. 
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Earthquake USA/Los 
Angeles 
• Demographic characteristics 
• See self as responsible  
• Outcome expectancy (efficacy of adjustments) 
Lindell/Whitney 
2000 
 
 
Risk perception does correlate with 
intentions and action. 
Volcanic 
eruption 
New 
Zealand/North 
Island 
• Direct personal experience (important for awareness; 
stimulates information-seeking) 
• Normalisation bias 
• Optimistic bias 
Johnston et al. 
(1999) 
Risk perception and knowledge do 
not show a straightforward 
relationship with action. 
Earthquake Japan/Tokyo-
Yokohama 
USA/Los 
Angeles 
• Economic level of individuals (income)  
• Perceived vulnerability of the home 
• Age (only in Japan, not in USA) 
• Sense of control over one’s destiny (only in USA, not in 
Japan) 
Palm (1998) The paper mainly investigates the 
impact of culture on risk perception 
and action, and the differences 
between residents of Tokyo and Los 
Angeles. 
Earthquake Iran/Tehran and 
Rasht 
• Fatalistic attitudes 
• Hazard perception 
• Economic status 
Asgary /Willis 
(1997) 
Economic status was significant only 
in one of the research areas.  
Erosion Bangladesh • Economic level of individuals 
• Educational level of individuals 
• Experience of erosion  
• Helplessness/fatalism 
• Kinship  
• Dependence of cultivation  
Mamun (1996) Resettlement in safer areas was 
investigated in the study. 
Earthquake USA/California For risk perception:  
• Risk communication factors (salience, message style and 
frequency etc.)  
For action:  
• Information-seeking  
• Social support and interaction (knowing other people taking 
measures) 
Mileti & 
Fitzpatrick (1992) 
Risk perception was important for 
information-seeking. 
Earthquake  USA/California 
Los Angeles 
• Denial 
• Poor predictability/onset time 
Lehman & Taylor 
(1987) 
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The studies presented in Table 4.1 demonstrate that individual preparedness for 
earthquakes or other natural hazards is a complex process determined by many 
interacting social, economic, environmental and personal factors. In this context, we have 
developed a conceptual framework which we used during the collection and analysis of 
data. The framework is illustrated in Figure 2.1; the details are discussed elsewhere 
(Tekeli-Yeşil, in press)8 but can be explained briefly as follows. In the case of a risk of 
hazard occurrence, awareness of this risk – which covers knowledge about the risk and its 
consequences, how to cope with it and risk perception – is a pre-requisite to undertaking 
protective measures. The next stage is evaluation by individuals of the physical, 
psychological and economic costs and benefits of taking action. According to the results 
of this evaluation, the sequence might continue with a person’s attitudes towards and 
intentions regarding taking action for mitigation and preparedness, followed by the action 
taken. Each stage and the transition phases can be positively or negatively influenced by 
intervening personal, social or environmental factors. Sometimes, as a consequence of a 
disaster or some other development, the action concerned may be followed by evaluation 
applied to all or some of the stages. The evaluation phase will not be considered in this 
study. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Section 2.2 in this thesis. 
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4.3 Methodology 
The study presented in this paper is the first part of a larger study. Here, qualitative 
research methods, namely FGDs and in-depth interviews (Bernard, 2000; Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005; Kitzinger, 1995; Morgan, 1998; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2002), were used 
to test the research questions. 
 
4.4 Research site 
Turkey is traversed by active faults, and in 1999 the Marmara region, in which Istanbul is 
located, was shaken by two severe earthquakes on 17 August and 12 November with 
magnitudes of 7.4 and 7.2 on the Richter scale, respectively. These earthquakes claimed 
nearly 18,000 lives and caused severe damage (T.C. Sayıştay Başkanlığı, 2002/3). 
Istanbul was only slightly affected by these earthquakes compared to other cities in the 
Marmara region, but some authors have estimated that there is a 62% (± 15%) probability 
of an earthquake of a magnitude ~7 on the Richter scale in the region in any 30-year 
period (Parsons et al., 2000). The province of Istanbul consists of one metropolitan 
municipality and 32 district municipalities. We selected two of these districts for the 
study (Figure 4.2): Bakırköy, located in the first-degree earthquake risk zone and 
expected to be one of the districts that would experience the highest intensity from the 
expected earthquake, and Beykoz, located in the second-degree risk zone and expected to 
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be one of the districts that would experience the lowest intensity.9 Within the districts, 
there is a variety of neighbourhoods with socioeconomic status. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  BU Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake Research Institute, 2003 
(The location of research sites are marked approximately) 
 
4.5 Sample and data collection 
We conducted a total of 12 FGDs. The participants were recruited from existing social 
groups such as people working in the same place, members of a neighbourhood 
association or participants in a course, in the two districts. All participants were adults 
                                                 
9
 For detailed information about earthquake zones and expected site-dependent intensity distribution, see 
Afet Işleri Genel Müdürlüğü Deprem Araştırma Dairesi/General Directorate of Disaster Affairs, 
Earthquake Research Department (http://www.deprem.gov.tr; and B.U., 2003: Earthquake Risk Assessment 
for the Istanbul Metropolitan Area Final Report. Boğaziçi University Press, Istanbul 
Bakırköy 
Beykoz 
Figure 4.1 Istanbul, site-dependent intensity distribution of a scenario earthquake 
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able to take decisions about their homes. We considered their economic status and 
educational level in order to assign the groups to a high, moderate or low socioeconomic 
level (SEL), based on information from key contacts about the participants’ profiles 
(Table 4.2). We used a semi-structured question guide during all the discussions. The 
question guide was checked with a pre-test discussion and covered topics in the 
conceptual framework. The groups consisted of 6 to 10 people. Gender was not 
considered while building up the groups, although two groups consisted only of men and 
one group only of women. The other nine groups involved both men and women. Most of 
the discussions took place where the participants were likely to meet (e.g. a workplace or 
office of the association of which the participants were members). 
Table 4.2 Distribution of focus group discussions 
SEL Bakırköy  Beykoz Total 
 
No. of FGDs (No. of people participated in each FGD) No. of FGDs 
Low SEL 2 (8 + 7) 2 (10 + 6) 4 
Moderate SEL 3 (7 + 8 + 6) 2 (10 + 8) 5 
High SEL 2 (10 + 7)  1 (6 ) 3 
Total 7 (53) 5 (40) 12 (93) 
 
Additionally we carried out 11 in-depth interviews with authorities, experts in the social 
and natural sciences, administrators and those responsible for implementing various 
mitigation and preparedness programmes as well as other key informants. 
All discussions and interviews were audiotaped with the permission of the participants 
and then transcribed verbatim. In all FGDs, besides the moderator, an observer was 
present to take notes and observe responses. The Maxqda® software programme was 
used in data management. Codes and sub-codes were organised according to the 
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framework of the study and the question guide to extract relevant sections for the 
analysis. 
4.6 Results 
Analysis of the collected data showed that participants did not follow a common path 
towards action. Within our conceptual framework there were three different patterns 
which the participants exhibited. The first and the most common pattern was interruption 
of the impetus towards action within or after the awareness stage. The second and less 
common pattern was that after the awareness stage respondents went forward to a 
subsequent stage or stages, but again the sequence was interrupted by intervening factors 
before they eventually took measures. The third and least common pattern was the 
completion of the sequence through to action. The results will be presented in the light of 
these three patterns. We will first discuss patterns 1 and 2 and factors that inhibit further 
steps to action. After that we will analyse pattern 3 and explore those factors that helped 
the participants and made it possible for them to complete the sequence. Citations from 
the discussions and in-depth interviews are provided throughout the text so that the 
respondents may speak in their own words. 
 
Pattern 1: Interruption of the sequence after the awareness stage 
The participants had relatively good knowledge about the risk of an earthquake and its 
consequences, but knew less about how they might adequately respond. Their knowledge 
was usually derived from the statements made by scientists in the media. They usually 
knew which parts of Istanbul were at what kind of risk: those from Bakırköy knew that 
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their district is at relatively more risk due to its proximity to the fault and less stable soil 
conditions, while those in Beykoz knew that their area is at relatively less risk. 
Participants also knew quite well what kind of consequences Istanbul would face in the 
event of an earthquake. They expected the damage to be somewhat localised and that it 
would be especially severe in locations where gecekondus are common. According to 
many participants, accessibility would be a big problem because roads and highways 
would be damaged or closed. They also talked about the eventual economic and 
psychological consequences. People mentioned that during the 1999 earthquakes, 
Istanbul was able to come to the aid of the cities affected, If Istanbul itself were to be 
severely affected, none of the neighbouring cities could act in the same manner since they 
lack the resources to do so and were also likely to be affected themselves. 
Participants had less and in some cases only superficial knowledge about what to do to 
prepare for an earthquake or mitigate its damage. When people were asked about possible 
mitigation and preparedness measures, the most common measures that were mentioned 
were having an earthquake bag/kit and having the building tested for construction quality, 
followed by fixing high furniture to walls. However, even those who knew that an 
earthquake bag was an earthquake preparedness activity did not necessarily know what to 
put in it. 
Although the general risk perception for Istanbul city was high in all groups, participants 
did not think that they themselves were at risk. Some of the participants who were at risk 
tended to rationalize their situation:  
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“IB: ...a ground investigation was done here in Osmaniye [a sub-district of Bakırköy] by experts. 
They said, “Here is better than other parts of Bakırköy”. Here is limestone, not stable and soft, but 
still it is better compared with other places in Bakırköy. 
FB: Here is the most solid ground within Bakırköy. 
EH: There were limestone-kilns; in the past, stone was obtained from here.” 
(FGD, conversation between a female and two male participants - Bakırköy–Moderate SEL) 
 
In-depth interviews confirmed the findings above: experts also thought that people knew 
the risk but that this did not lead to critical awareness and finally to action. 
  
Pattern 2: Interruption of the sequence after the evaluation of costs and benefits 
and/or attitudes-intentions stages 
Some of the respondents who were aware of the risk tried to take further steps. Most of 
the participants who could move forward to evaluation of costs and benefits stage gave 
priority to short-term needs. They preferred to invest their limited time and money in 
daily needs, not in the probability that an earthquake would happen in 20–30 years’ time.  
 
“… Much research about Turkey has shown that our culture has low levels of future orientation… 
Especially the absence of the habit of future orientation, seeing everything in the context of today 
or interrelated with the past, is a very important factor. Perhaps it is not inappropriate in a country 
such as Turkey. As people have accepted this, they have authenticity. It is not possible to make 
plans, as done in countries like Sweden or Switzerland for 3–4–10 years, in a country that has to 
deal with continuous economic crises, disasters and social problems.” 
(In-depth interviews, male, scientist) 
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In addition, some of the participants thought that taking some measures, such as keeping 
an earthquake kit, remind people when they see them every day of the threat and cause 
psychological problems. Instead of facing such problems they prefer not to take the 
measures: 
 
“PH: … another reason is the psychological issue. There is death at the end of such a disaster. To 
prepare for death is not something that everybody can tolerate. …” 
(FGD, Female, Moderate SEL, Bakırköy) 
 
Although many of the participants showed positive attitudes towards precautions, few 
participants were inclined or intended to take steps towards earthquake mitigation and 
disaster preparedness. Some participants mentioned that if a cheap retrofitting credit were 
provided by the state they would like to retrofit their homes. 
Small events, such as our discussions, may motivate people and refresh existing 
intentions. 
 
“AH: Personally I am thinking of taking further steps. Due to this discussion an earthquake bell is 
ringing in my ears. I will have a look at my earthquake bag.” 
(FGD, Female, Moderate SEL, Beykoz) 
 
Impediments in patterns 1 and 2  
Among the intervening personal, social and environmental factors, those most evidently 
impeding further progress in patterns 1 and 2 are presented below. 
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Personal intervening factors  
Outcome expectancy (absence of belief in micro-scale, individual and non-structural 
measures). 
Almost all participants believed in mitigation and preparedness activities taken on the 
macro-scale, while many did not believe much in the effectiveness of measures taken on 
the small or micro-scales or at individual level. In addition, they believed more in 
structural (i.e. retrofitting the building) than non-structural mitigation or individual 
preparedness measures (i.e. fixing high furniture to the wall or keeping an earthquake 
bag). 
 
“SH: I do not understand, could you please explain it to me? I nail (fix) the shelf to the wall in 
order to prevent it falling on my head. What would happen if this shelf falls on my head when the 
building is collapsed? In Japan they say: ‘that thing should not fall down, this thing should not 
injure me.’ Building is strong in Japan, it does not collapse.”  
(FGD, Female, Moderate SEL, Beykoz) 
 
“OB: Overall measures should be taken. Our houses are not the problem. When measures are not 
taken in total in your living environment, then the measures taken by yourself have no meaning. 
Unless an improvement (restoration) begins in the whole of Istanbul, the measures that we would 
take personally have no meaning.” 
(FGD, Male, Higher SEL, Bakırköy) 
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However, in some cases, participants’ explanations about their lack of belief in the 
effectiveness of measures and individual preparedness would seem to relate to 
transferring responsibility to others (e.g. the state, government or local authorities). 
 
Helplessness 
Fatalism or religious attitudes towards disasters did not seem important in disaster 
preparation. This comment needs some refinement, however, because helplessness was 
very common and in some cases openly expressed as fatalism, with helplessness as the 
underlying factor and fatalism the coping strategy. Several times during discussions we 
had to explore more deeply and clarify contradictions between fatalistic expressions and 
measures that were intended or had been taken. One type of response here was “first you 
have to take all possible measures and then trust in God”. A second type is illustrated in 
the following examples:  
 
“MB2: Huh, helplessness we give up, it means helplessness you throw in the towel...… 
AB: It means, you acquiesce to everything from the beginning, for example you are a big/large 
man. Me? This man could beat me, it is so simple, when this earthquake comes, I can’t do 
anything.” 
(FGD, Males, Low SEL, Bakırköy) 
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ZB: The Turkish people are in constant danger… Earthquakes are just one of these (dangers). 
Therefore people living in the community should be a little bit fatalist. It should not be seen to be 
related with the religious attitude; otherwise (if people are not a little bit fatalist) we would all be 
mentally ill. 
 (FGD, Male, High SEL, Bakırköy) 
 
According to some of the respondents to the in-depth interviews, traumatisation and false 
perceptions about the damage also caused helplessness. 
 
“...Other than the people who went to Kocaeli (the most affected area in the 17 August 
earthquake in 1999) to join solidarity activities, most of the Istanbul residents witnessed 
the earthquake on television. This witnessing experience was a little bit traumatic and 
battering, because those who did not personally observe the consequences of the 
earthquake and only saw it on television, with screens of collapsed buildings and battered 
people images on televisions they perceived it as if Kocaeli had totally collapsed …”  
 (In-depth interviews, female, social worker, has coordinated public mitigation-preparedness 
programmes) 
Social and economic intervening factors  
Low SEL 
Taking action for mitigation and preparedness was not very common among participants 
with a lower SEL. Regardless of the district in which they lived, almost all of them had 
carried out either no or very few measures. 
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“SB: I haven’t seen any of my neighbours taking such measures for the earthquake, I also haven't 
heard about it from anybody. As I said a few minutes ago, it depends on resources … you know 
people earn their living with difficulty, nobody thinks about precautions. O.K., they know that an 
earthquake will hit, but, for example, my neighbour, now he is looking for a basement to rent, 
really nobody cares whether the walls are cracked or whatever it is.”  
(FGD, Male, Low SEL, Bakırköy)  
 
The experts who were interviewed were divided on this issue: those with engineering or 
administrative backgrounds indicated the importance of economic status, those who were 
implementing public preparedness programmes or investigating such programmes 
thought that there was no direct relationship between taking precautions and economic 
status. 
 
“We have seen that the most important problem is financial… We asked how important is it for 
you to arrange financial sources or credit support for the retrofitting: the response was 70% very 
important, 20% important… the only solution is financial support.” 
(In-depth interviews, male, engineer, coordinating a structural mitigation programme) 
 
“…I don’t have the impression that people without economic or material problems undertake such 
measures more comfortably or easier… The objection ‘We don’t have economic means to do this’ 
arises when we work with low-income groups. But in reality this is just an L-profile (an appliance 
to fix high furniture to the wall), simple to use, can be found in any market selling building 
materials, in any hardware store. Even when we explain this, the criticism ‘We don’t have 
economic means to use this’ still comes up, but it is not really true. Again safety culture, I relate 
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such objections to the fact that the cornerstones of safe attitudes in the community are not yet in 
place…” 
(In-depth interviews, female, social worker, has coordinated public mitigation preparedness programmes) 
 
Culture of negligence in the context of multiple and/or constant risks in the community  
A culture of negligence, which can be described as ignoring security rules or safety 
regulations in general in many aspects of daily life, for example while driving or while 
working, was mentioned by the respondents to in-depth interviews and group discussions 
with different terms or examples (e.g. lack of a culture of safety). Owing to the multiple 
risks and/or constant threats in daily life, people and even institutions act in negligence of 
such risks. Unfortunately, as in a vicious circle, this culture of negligence is also 
increasing or reproducing the existing risks in daily life. Statements by the participants 
also focused on multiple risks in daily life as a reason for negligence.  
 
“OB: … In our community the problem is: this signboard can also fall down on my head (as 
security measures may not necessarily be applied or controlled), I may also fall into a hole dug by 
the municipality (and not covered later), I may also die because of a natural disaster. Here is a 
country full of surprises. Therefore earthquakes or such events are extreme things for us.”  
(FGD, Male, High SEL, Bakırköy) 
 
Lack of trust 
Trust (in the institutions that plan, apply and control retrofitting projects or other 
preparedness programmes) was stated as an important determinant for making decisions 
in favour of mitigation of damage. Neither commercial nor public institutions have 
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gained individuals’ trust. In group discussions it was also observed that scientists and 
universities enjoyed a high degree of trust among the participants, although recent 
conflicts between scientists about the magnitude and epicentre of the predicted 
earthquake have damaged that trust somewhat. 
 
Environmental intervening factors  
Onset time–poor predictability and normalisation bias 
Earthquakes are sudden-onset hazards that strike at any time without warning. Measures 
should, therefore, be taken continuously: they cannot be seasonal or periodic. This was 
often mentioned as a hindrance to taking pre-emptive action:  
 
ÖB: ...Of course then (if he could know when an earthquake will hit) a measure would be taken, 
now what should the people do for an earthquake that will happen in 25 years? (Showed his hands 
as if asking what?) It will happen in 25 years, also what will I be till that time? Ha when scientists 
would say ‘it will happen in 2 years’ people adjust themselves according to 2 years not to 25 
years. Now if they would say ‘in 2 years the earthquake will hit’ I would move to a new place, I 
would go to my village (from which he immigrated) the ground of my village is more solid. 
(FGD, male, Low SEL, Bakırköy) 
 
Both in discussions and interviews it was stated that the risk was easily forgotten when 
life returned to normal after the earthquakes in 1999. Small earthquakes in Turkey or an 
earthquake somewhere else in the world might refresh people’s intentions and actions, 
but these phases are usually short-lived. 
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“This is a troublesome task, if I would give an example from myself; I carried a whistle, spare 
money with me all the time in the beginning. But even I leave the whistle behind when I change 
my bag. Even I, as a conscious educator, do this. My earthquake bag was ready and it was ready 
standing somewhere in the hallway, now it has been removed.”  
(In-depth interviews, female, disaster preparedness educator of a relevant association) 
 
“We asked about the earthquake bag: in the first years (after the earthquakes) 50% of the 
participants raised their hands (meaning they have an earthquake bag); this fell to 0 more 
recently.” 
(In-depth interviews, female, coordinator, disaster preparedness education unit of a university 
institute) 
 
Pattern 3: completion of the sequence with action 
As mentioned above, most of the participants had good knowledge about the risk of an 
earthquake and its consequences, but their knowledge about how to cope with 
earthquakes varied. Participants in groups with moderate/high SELs who had had direct 
experience of an earthquake were the best informed about how to cope with an 
earthquake. These people were also keener to acquire additional information. A 
respondent in an in-depth interview, who prepared and presented a weekly radio 
programme about mitigation of damage and earthquake preparedness, described his 
audience as being already interested in the subject, responsive and getting prepared. 
Participants in groups with moderate and high SELs and those who had had direct 
experience of an earthquake demonstrated positive attitudes and more intention to take 
further action. 
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Many participants had taken some kind of action, but it is difficult to discuss the quality 
and completeness of these precautions. Although there was a difference in action taken 
between groups in Beykoz and Bakırköy (i.e. between low- and high-risk zones), there 
was a relatively bigger difference between SELs within and between these districts. 
The most frequently mentioned precaution taken was keeping an earthquake kit/bag, 
which is also one of the best known preparations. The second most frequently mentioned 
precaution was fixing high furniture securely to walls. Placing large or heavy objects on 
lower shelves and storing breakable items in low or closed cupboards with latches were 
also mentioned, although less often, even though such measures cost (next to) nothing. 
Geotechnical investigation of the building site, investigation of building quality and 
retrofitting the building were usually done by participants in groups with moderate and 
high SELs. However, some participants in groups with moderate or low SELs had done 
“building investigations” or “retrofitting” themselves or had them done by a friend with a 
relevant professional background (e.g. civil engineer, architect or foreman), but who 
might not necessarily be working in this specialised field. 
Drawing up a plan about what an entire family should do and how to reunite during and 
after an earthquake was rarely mentioned and, when it was, mainly by participants with 
moderate or high SELs. Participants with a family plan tended to be those with children, 
but (very) few families had simulated or rehearsed their plans. 
Other precautions mentioned included learning what to do during and after an 
earthquake. Earthquake insurance was not mentioned very often in discussions, although 
it is compulsory and some people mentioned that they did have it. Moving was rarely 
mentioned. Those that moved were either better off or moving was already on the 
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family’s agenda. In these cases, a safe neighbourhood or a building known to be safe had 
been chosen. Some female participants mentioned learning how to shut off the gas and 
switch off the electricity. Having a fire extinguisher and learning how to use it, and 
taking earthquake training or participating in a voluntary group were the least mentioned 
activities regarding preparedness. 
There were “extreme” precautions, especially among high-SEL participants, such as 
having a steel/iron shelter or their own rescue apparatus. 
Experts who were interviewed thought that even though there are good examples of 
individual preparedness, a high percentage of people in Istanbul are totally unprepared 
for an earthquake. 
 
Motivating factors for pattern 3  
Among personal, social/economic and environmental intervening factors, the factors that 
most evidently motivate individuals to complete the sequence with action are presented 
below. 
 
Personal intervening factors 
Direct personal experience 
In most of the groups, the participants demonstrating the highest level of preparedness 
and greatest motivation for taking action were those with some direct experience of the 
1999 earthquakes. People who had experienced them directly (e.g. through losing close 
relatives or friends and/or participating actively in solidarity activities) and those who had 
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participated in the rescue efforts were more likely to take precautions and showed a 
greater intention to take further action.  
 
“SB: I was one of the volunteers who ran to act in solidarity the next day after the '99 earthquake. I 
was sent by the company (for which he was working at that time)… we didn’t have any 
knowledge about organising rescue or solidarity activities, we couldn’t do anything, we saw the 
disaster, we were in an incapable position, in terms of helping people, rescuing them, a terrible 
disaster, terrible damage. After this earthquake I thought about what I can do at home, I did some 
little things. I saw the disasters there after two earthquakes, also at Kaynaşlı (a sub-district close to 
the epicentre of the second earthquake in 1999), there my father-in-law died. After that I was more 
worried…” 
(FGD, male, had undertaken many mitigation and preparedness measures at home, moderate 
SEL, Beykoz) 
 
“EB: You asked us why we have been involved in the group (a local, non-professional voluntary 
rescue team): To be conscious. I lost many relatives during the earthquake (17 August 1999). The 
son of my uncle (his corpse) was brought out from the rubble after 27 hours and I was like this 
(standing) there, we couldn’t do anything; we were waiting behind the red band and waiting for 
his body to come out.”    
(FGD, male, had undertaken many mitigation and preparedness measures at home, member of a 
local voluntary rescue team, moderate SEL, Bakırköy) 
 
Higher educational level 
Mitigation and preparedness activities were more common among group participants with 
higher educational levels. Even within the groups with low SEL, those with more 
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education were more likely to take precautions. Awareness was clearly higher among 
participants with better education. 
In-depth interviews also indicated that educational level plays a significant role, 
especially for knowledge about the risk, its consequences and how to cope with it. 
 
Social intervening factors  
Social interaction 
Participants who had taken some measures had often tried to persuade those in their circle 
to take similar measures. Respondents had found it easier to take measures when they 
saw examples that persuaded them of the efficacy of such measures. For example, many 
participants did not believe that insurance would be beneficial or would function properly 
in the event of a big earthquake, but a respondent in a high SEL group in Beykoz had 
obtained compulsory earthquake insurance and additional private insurance both for his 
home and his workplace after seeing one of his friends, a commercial colleague, 
rebuilding his factory after the 17 August 1999 earthquake with money from his 
insurance claim. 
Both in the groups and in-depth interviews, many participants had not seen examples of 
individual preparedness that would have motivated them. 
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“In Turkey the majority don’t believe, accept anything without having seen it. This is how we 
spread our impact: we have a strategy like the following: We select three neighbourhoods in each 
district. Because when these neighbourhoods are involved, the neighbouring neighbourhoods take 
the attitude ‘we should get involved too’.”  
(In-depth interviews, male, programme manager of a preparedness project) 
 
Additionally, many of the interviews indicated that social interaction and social networks 
play a key role in the implementation of mitigation and preparedness programmes among 
women and in districts where traditional relationships are still alive. In almost all of the 
in-depth interviews, muhtars10 were also mentioned as key persons to reach the public 
and different neighbourhood social networks. 
  
Environmental intervening factors 
Location of home 
Although the difference in taking precautions between higher- and lower-risk areas was 
not great, more participants in Bakırköy (the higher-risk area) had taken some measures 
compared to participants in Beykoz (the lower-risk area). 
 
4.7 Discussion  
The study supplied very rich data, from which we have presented only the most 
prominent findings, but because of the nature of the qualitative methods we cannot 
generalise from these findings. 
                                                 
10
 A muhtar is the elected head of a sub-district/neighbourhood.  
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The study was designed to improve our understanding of the process by which 
individuals take measures to mitigate damage and be prepared. We considered the whole 
process and could not, therefore, go into great detail on any one theme, each of which 
deserves a separate investigation. Table 4.3 summarizes the findings of our study and the 
existing literature. 
 
Table 4.3 Comparison of the study findings with the findings of cited literature  
 Literature* Our study 
Obstacles  
Low SEL √ √ 
Outcome expectancy (absence of belief in 
the efficacy of measurements) 
√ √ 
Helplessness √ √ 
Culture of negligence No info √ 
Lack of trust √ √ 
Onset time/suddenness of onset √ √ 
Normalisation bias √ √ 
Fatalism √/ 0 0 
Motivating factors  
Location (living in higher-risk areas) √ √ 
High risk perception  √/0 0 
Direct personal experience √ √ 
Hazard experience √ 0 
Higher education level √ √ 
Social interaction √ √ 
*√ indicates association with taking action; 0 indicates no association 
 
The risk of an earthquake in the Marmara region was highlighted after the earthquakes in 
1999 and information about it has been broadly disseminated among the citizens of 
Istanbul, including the participants in our group discussions. Participants displayed a 
considerable level of knowledge about the risk and its consequences and presented a 
realistic appraisal of the risk. In general, however, they were less well informed about 
how to cope with an earthquake themselves, although those with higher educational 
levels were better informed than those with lower educational levels. In our case, the 
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source of this knowledge may have been the flood of information in the media and 
through interpersonal discussions after the 1999 earthquakes. However, much of this 
information (which people did not seek so much as they were exposed to it) was about 
the consequences of the recent earthquakes or characteristics of the predicted one, and did 
not necessarily prepare people adequately for the next one. Mileti & Fitzpatrick’s (1992) 
statement about information-seeking behaviour might explain this gap between 
knowledge of the risk and its consequences, and how to cope with it. Usually knowledge 
obtained passively had little effect on the taking of precautions, whereas knowledge 
obtained actively facilitated the process. 
Risk perception for Istanbul itself among the participants was high, but in both districts 
risk perception for self was lower than risk perception for the city as a whole. High-risk 
perception for Istanbul did not seem to have an influence on taking action: risk perception 
only led to action if participants personalized the risk. Further research is needed to study 
the relationship between risk perception for self and the taking of protective measures, 
and how people personalise risk. 
Our findings indicated that immediate or short-term benefits were quite important for 
decision-making regarding mitigation and preparedness activities. Additionally, for some 
individuals, taking preparedness measures might have psychological costs. 
Even though economic status plays an important and direct role in the taking of structural 
measures, it should not influence many non-structural measures. Economic status was, 
however, often cited in group discussions as a barrier even for non-structural measures 
that would cost little or nothing. Here the role of economic status may be indirect, and 
educational level or outcome expectancy may be confounding this finding. The findings 
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showed that some of the building investigations were done by residents themselves or by 
friends with professional backgrounds but who were not directly responsible or appointed 
for carrying out such investigations. This might be understood as a sign of intention 
towards taking mitigation measures in the context of a lack of resources or the existence 
of economic problems. The difference among experts about the role of economic status 
seems to relate to the type of measure. Structural measures, given priority by engineers 
and administrators, cost more and hence they identified economic status as important, 
whereas their colleagues in less investment-intense areas did not. These differences 
highlight the importance of having a multidisciplinary approach in disaster management. 
Some studies have identified fatalism as playing a role in disaster preparedness in Turkey 
(Inelmen et al., 2004), while others demonstrated that fatalism did not seem to be a major 
factor for earthquake preparedness (Dedeoğlu, 2006). Our findings showed that fatalism 
and religious attitude did not have a significant impact on mitigation and preparedness 
activities. Almost all participants, including those with a strong religious belief, were 
aware of the reasons for earthquakes and the causes of damage. A sense of helplessness 
was, however, very common and was sometimes expressed as if it were fatalism. Palm 
(1998) in her study in Japan, suggests that in some cultures acceptance of destiny does 
not imply passive acceptance of fate, but instead a realistic assessment of elements that 
one cannot control. This perspective may also apply in the scenario we investigated. 
Qualitative studies such as this one seem the most appropriate for a full exploration of 
such attitudes with all their contradictions and inconsistencies. On the other hand, 
witnessing the disaster through the media led to helplessness and disbelief about 
protective behaviour among some group participants. The images broadcast by television 
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gave rise to an inaccurate perception of damage and precautions. The impression given 
about the consequences of the 17 August 1999 earthquake in Izmit (Kocaeli) was that 
absolutely everything had been destroyed. Although there was a very high level of 
damage, in fact only 5% of the buildings were totally destroyed11. This false picture also 
fed disbelief in the effectiveness of mitigation and preparedness measures. 
Group participants showed low levels of trust towards actors in the construction industry 
and its related services and towards sources of information. This problem is complex and 
requires more intensive investigation. Given the trust shown in general towards 
universities and scientists, these actors might play an important role in disaster 
communication. 
Our findings about the role of the onset time and poor predictability in the taking of 
action support those of Lehman and Taylor (1987), who suggested that individuals at risk 
of being subject to a highly probable catastrophic event of unknown timing may cope 
with the threat through denial and obliviousness. The normalisation of life between the 
previous and the next damaging event also caused the group participants to forget about 
the risk or to perceive no urgency to act. Low levels of planning for the future generally 
in society (Inelmen et al., 2004) might be another explanation for why onset time and 
normalisation bias impede the taking of action. 
In addition to existing findings in the literature, our study showed that a culture of 
negligence and the existence of constant multiple risks in daily life led group participants 
to take earthquake preparedness less seriously or to give it less priority in relation to other 
                                                 
11
 BU., 2003: Earthquake Risk Assessment for the Istanbul Metropolitan Area Final Report. Boğaziçi 
University Press, Istanbul. 
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risks. Group participants tended to be unconcerned about various risks in their daily lives 
and did not take security measures in other aspects of life (e. g. while driving). A high 
percentage of smoking (PIAR, 1998; TUIK, 2009) and low percentage of safety belt use 
while driving a car (TAM, 1999) in Turkey underline these statements by group 
participants and experts about the culture of negligence. 
In the groups, educational level, direct experience with an earthquake and socioeconomic 
level were all found to play key roles at almost all stages of taking action. 
After the two earthquakes in 1999, many people went to the disaster areas either to search 
for their relatives/friends or to offer support and thus witnessed the impact of the 
earthquake directly. Among the group participants this experience was a strong 
motivating factor for earthquake preparedness. The experiences of such individuals could 
be mobilised to reach different groups in sub-districts or neighbourhoods. 
Our data indicated that social interaction and social networks were important factors 
motivating our group participants to undertake protective measures. Women and muhtars 
were mentioned as key persons for social interactions. Further research is needed to 
examine how such interactions function among different social groups in order to 
enhance the effectiveness of public programmes. 
In conclusion, our findings mainly correspond with earlier studies about the roles of 
socioeconomic and educational levels, outcome expectancy, helplessness, lack of trust, 
suddenness of onset, normalisation bias, location, direct personal experience and social 
interaction. Additionally a cultural phenomenon – negligence – was also found to be 
associated with failure to undertake earthquake precautions among the group participants.  
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4.8 Recommendations  
In the disaster community, it is widely acknowledged that hazards trigger disasters when 
they meet with vulnerability, hence the basis of disaster management is the reduction of 
vulnerability. Our study showed that lower socioeconomic and educational levels, which 
are commonly listed as components of vulnerability, are the main factors hindering 
participants in taking precautions for earthquakes. But the causes of such vulnerability 
are rooted in international and national political, economic and social factors12 which are 
beyond the scope of this paper. Our recommendations below are, therefore, for practical 
approaches to enhance existing mitigation and preparedness programmes and for further 
research. 
Our study has pointed to two main problems with current public activities that aim to 
increase risk awareness and corresponding mitigation and preparedness activities. The 
first is the content of such activities. Any kind of activity that aims to increase public 
awareness should focus more on what individuals can do to prepare themselves or to 
reduce their own losses rather than on information about the actual risk and its features, 
about which people already have some knowledge, without excluding the latter. 
The second issue is how this information is communicated. Awareness is a prerequisite 
for taking action but conventional awareness programmes that merely disseminate 
information are not very useful in helping people take further steps. Such programmes 
should take into consideration the socioeconomic and educational levels of target 
populations and use interactive methods so that people can personalize the risk and gain 
                                                 
12
 For detailed information on the components of vulnerability and their linkages to root causes see Wisner 
et al, (2003). 
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the ability and self-confidence to cope with it. Women, muhtars and people who have had 
direct experience of an earthquake are some of the key people to mobilise to reach target 
populations. Scientists, who enjoy a high level of trust, might also be actors in disaster 
communication, although their messages should be about measures to take rather than 
confusing information about fault lines and the magnitude of the predicted earthquake. 
Mitigation and preparedness programmes can involve some methods that allow social 
interactions to function, such as persuasive examples of successful action taken by both 
ordinary people and public figures that clearly explain the effectiveness of the measures. 
Social interaction might also be used to disseminate information among traditional 
neighbourhoods and women. In view of the statements in the groups about belief in the 
effectiveness of macro- rather than micro-measures, state institutions should also set an 
example to the public by carrying out both structural and non-structural measures and 
fulfilling their responsibility to safeguard citizens’ lives and wellbeing. 
It seems that keeping the earthquake hazard on the agenda through frequent messages to 
the public encourages people to be prepared. 
People tend to take precautions which do not cost much time and money. If more 
extensive precautions, such as retrofitting buildings, were subsidized, more people might 
take them. Investments should be made in developing easier methods of mitigation and 
preparedness. Efforts to overcome the culture of negligence and create instead a culture 
of safety in the community would help not only in the taking of precautions regarding 
earthquakes, but also in many other measures related to various daily risks. Schools 
might be a starting place for such actions. Safety in daily life (in traffic, at home, in the 
neighbourhood, related to natural hazards, etc.) could be integrated into the curriculum. 
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All of the issues raised in this paper might be investigated in more depth, but we 
particularly suggest further research on the following issues: (i) the relationship between 
the perception of risk for oneself and taking appropriate measures; (ii) how people 
personalise the risk; and (iii) lack of trust and how to overcome it in disaster 
communication. 
Finally, we suggest further research about the quantification and generalisation of our 
findings in this paper.
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5. Additional findings from the qualitative part of the 
study 
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It will never happen to me 
This section discusses the role of unrealistic optimism, transferring responsibility to 
others, tenure (ownership/rental) and group dynamics in taking mitigation and 
preparedness action at individual level. As the background and the methodology of the 
study were explained in the previous chapter they will not be repeated here. 
 
5.1 Results 
Unrealistic optimism – optimistic bias 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, even though participants had a high perception of 
the risk in Istanbul, they did not perceive a high risk for themselves. A parallel finding 
about this issue is the unrealistic optimism expressed by some of the participants. Some 
thought that such things only happen to others, so their suggested solutions or expressed 
worries related to others. 
 
Campaigns can be organised, everybody can help these people (people who are living in 
gecekondus). TOKI (Housing Development Administration of Turkey that produces social 
housing) can build houses for these people. 
(FGD, Female - Bakırköy–High SEL) 
 
Can we live without hope? The earthquake will hit, but we have the hope that nothing will happen 
to us. 
(FGD, Female - Beykoz–Moderate SEL) 
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I think I will be affected intensively, but I guess that I would not die. Probably I would not die. 
(FGD, Female - Beykoz–Lower SEL) 
Transferring responsibility to others 
Almost all groups spoke about transferring responsibility to others (e.g. the state, 
government or local authorities), but this was mainly raised in the groups with lower 
SELs. In many groups, participants said it was the responsibility of state institutions to 
take the first steps regarding earthquake preparedness. They would then follow suit. This 
was also stated as a reason for why the public is not doing much about individual 
earthquake preparedness. 
 
They (state /municipality) have to investigate our buildings in order to identify existing or possible 
damage. We want our building to be investigated. 
(FGD, Female - Bakırköy–Lower SEL) 
 
As we do not have the consciousness of being a citizen, we are not involved in such tasks. We 
have the habit of waiting such task from others. 
 (FGD, Female - Bakırköy–Moderate SEL) 
 
Think about that; what would the people do, who sees virtually that such measures have been 
taken around them? They would also behave in the same manner, it is very natural. You are within 
a war, but do either the army or the government or the municipality act as if there is a war? You 
cannot understand that a war is going on. You can only understand when a bomb falls on your 
head. 
(In-depth interviews, male, programmer and presenter of a weekly radio programme about 
earthquake preparedness) 
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Tenure  
Participants who had taken some structural measures such as retrofitting their homes 
were mainly homeowners. On the other hand, some of the tenants mentioned the 
difficulties of taking measures in a rented dwelling, such as opposition from the landlord 
to attaching weighty things to walls so that they could not fix high furniture securely. 
Others said that they moved frequently so they had not taken many precautions. Almost 
none of the tenant participants had earthquake insurance.  
 
I hadn’t taken anything (any precautions) for mitigation of the damage. The house is not mine and 
I do not have the possibility to move out. When that day comes (when earthquake hits), if I were 
safe (after the event) then I will do what I have said (during the discussions he told about some 
preparedness to survive after the event) 
(FGD, Male - Beykoz–Lower SEL) 
 
I am a tenant, I want to do (take precautions) but even if I want I cannot hammer a nail, hang a 
picture. Then, I will do when I own my house… 
(FGD, Female - Bakırköy–Upper-moderate SEL) 
 
Group dynamics (in blocks of flats)  
The building stock of Istanbul consists mainly of blocks of flats, so most of the group 
participants were flat-dwellers. They discussed the difficulty of taking common decisions 
about structural measures regarding the building. The main reason for disagreement was 
cost. 
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Experts also mentioned this point as an impediment to taking structural measures in 
multistorey buildings, but they also pointed to recent developments regarding changes in 
the regulations making it possible to take such action without a consensus in case of 
safety needs. 
 
ZB: I have interrupted you, but the house belongs to him (talking about the house of SB) and it is a 
single house, therefore he has such a possibility. 
SB: I have the chance; I am not dependent on anybody. Mr. C lives in a house with six apartments, 
for a small thing six people have to come together and agree on, it is not possible. I have a very 
exceptional position. 
(FGD, Males–Beykoz–Moderate SEL) 
 
5.2 Discussion 
These additional findings also showed that the process of taking mitigation and 
preparedness measures in anticipation of an earthquake is influenced by many 
intervening factors. Some of the group participants showed unrealistic optimism about 
the personal consequences of the predicted earthquake. This finding is possibly linked 
with the low levels of risk perception for self mentioned in the previous chapter. As a 
consequence of this optimistic bias, some of the participants behaved as if such things 
usually happened to others and did not accept the risk for themselves. Comparable 
unrealistic optimism has been found in other studies (Burger & Palmer, 1992; 
Burningham et al., 2008). Additionally, Spittal and colleagues (2005) discussed the 
similar role of unrealistic optimism regarding judgments about levels of individual 
preparedness. In order to overcome the optimistic bias the messages used in public 
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disaster mitigation and preparedness programmes should communicate the risk 
appropriately. Messages should contain visible and concrete examples based on 
experience emphasizing that everybody is at risk, not just others. Past experience drawn 
from anti-smoking or safety-belt use campaigns may be useful in how to communicate 
the risk. 
Inelmen and colleagues (2004) also discussed transferring responsibility to state 
institutions in their study. They explained this situation with the cultural phenomena 
“expecting actions from state in many areas”. Even though state institutions play the main 
role in reducing risk, the community and individuals should also be part of any risk 
reduction activity. An additional explanation may be the relationship between 
transferring responsibility to central authorities and believing in macro-measures 
(mentioned in the previous chapter). Some people might give value to macro-measures 
and see the state or government as responsible for earthquake preparedness. Further 
research would be valuable to understand an eventual correlation between these two 
issues. 
Structural measures need investment, so such investments have mainly been made by 
home owners, not by tenants of a landlord who generally see their situation as temporary. 
Similar findings were found in the study of T.C. Başbakanlık PUB (2005) and Larsson & 
Enander (1997). Information about the regulations to ensure the safety of buildings could 
be included in public preparedness programmes so as to show tenants and people living 
in multistorey buildings what they could do in case of disagreement. The opposition of 
landlords to some activities related to preparedness measures, such as fixing high 
furniture to the walls, may be the justification for tenant participants’ lack of action. 
It will never happen to me 
 100 
As also mentioned in Öncüler’s (2002) study, the carrying out of mitigation activities in 
multistorey buildings is a collective decision but getting agreement among many people 
is not an easy task. The recent change in the regulations allowing for action to be taken 
with the approval of a majority of the residents could be an encouraging development, 
but in such settings the taking of taking precautionary measures is still a collective 
process and the role of group dynamics must be taken into account. 
In conclusion, the process of taking action is highly complex, so that individual 
preparedness is a difficult task both for individuals and for those charged with 
implementing preparedness programmes who try to ensure that the public is prepared. 
Instead of passive information campaigns and programmes, disaster management 
agencies can design preparedness programmes that allow for the active participation of 
individuals and the community, thus getting them to accept the risk to themselves and 
share responsibility, and to empower them such that they are willing and able to 
overcome the problems in the process. In order to set up such programmes, 
multidisciplinary teams are needed which include, inter alia, experts in communication.
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In Part IV the findings of the quantitative study are discussed. The paper in Chapter 6 has 
been submitted to the journal Risk Analysis. 
A field survey was carried out in 2007 in two districts of Istanbul with different levels of 
earthquake risk; within these districts three socioeconomic levels were considered. A 
total of 1123 people were interviewed face to face. 
Analysis indicated that educational level of the respondents was the leading factor 
associated with taking at least three measures, followed by: living in a higher earthquake 
risk area, participating in rescue and solidarity activities in past earthquakes, a higher 
earthquake knowledge score, home ownership, living in a neighbourhood with higher 
SELs, a higher action-stimulating attitudes score and general safety score, and being in 
the young age group, in that order. 
The findings pointed to the role of knowledge about earthquakes and possible 
mitigation/preparedness measures, hence the importance of developing effective 
awareness programmes. These programmes should also consider the characteristics of 
different groups in the population. Motivated individuals, such as those who have 
participated in rescue and solidarity activities in past earthquakes, could be involved to 
reach other people. 
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6.1 Introduction 
An earthquake is expected to strike Istanbul in the near future. Some authors predict an 
earthquake of a magnitude of ~7 on the Richter scale with a 62% (±15%) probability in 
any 30-year period in the Marmara region, where Istanbul is located (Parsons et al., 
2000). The last destructive earthquakes in the region were on 17 August and 12 
November 1999, although Istanbul then suffered only minor damage. However, one 
scenario for an expected earthquake predicts that there would be 30,000–40,000 
casualties, more than 120,000 injured people needing hospitalization and more than 
600,000 households in need of shelter in Istanbul (BU, 2003). 
Although damage from earthquakes and loss of life can be reduced to a great extent by 
mitigation and preparedness activities such as retrofitting buildings, fixing high furniture 
to walls and drawing up a family disaster plan, national and international studies have 
shown that people appear to be unconcerned to prepare themselves (Dedeoğlu, 2006; 
Lindell & Perry, 2000). Little is known about the factors associated with this neglect. 
Previous studies have argued that factors associated with motivating individuals to take 
action13 include: residence in higher earthquake risk areas (Kalaça et al., 2007; Lindell & 
Prater, 2000); higher income or socioeconomic status, higher educational level, home 
ownership (Dedeoğlu, 2006; Fişek et al., 2003; Palm, 1998); age (Kalaça et al., 2007); 
being male, having a child at home, being married (Lindell & Whitney, 2000; Lindell & 
Prater, 2000; Russel, Goltz, & Bourque, 1995); experience of an earthquake such as 
suffering damage or losing loved ones in previous events (Kalaça et al., 2007; Lindell & 
                                                 
13
 In this paper the term taking action is used to describe action of taking measures by individuals to 
mitigate damage and to be prepared for earthquakes. 
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Prater, 2000); and social support and interaction (Mileti & Fitzpatrick, 1992). Factors 
associated with not taking action have been stated as: doubts about the effectiveness of 
the measures – outcome expectancy (Lindell & Whitney, 2000); denial, poor 
predictability and infrequent occurrence of the event (Lehman & Taylor, 1987); and 
fatalism (Asgary & Willis, 1997). 
Many studies have mentioned awareness and the level of knowledge about mitigation and 
preparedness measures among their respondents but there are no data showing the 
relationship between level of knowledge and taking action. Some studies have shown that 
high risk perception is associated with taking action (Kalaça et al., 2007). The taking of 
other risks, such as smoking and not using a seatbelt while driving, have also been 
studied and correlations have been found between not using a seatbelt and not taking 
action against earthquakes (Kalaça et al., 2007). 
Most national and international studies have been conducted either in selected 
populations, such as among university students, or within a small sample size or have 
only looked at specific factors such as risk perception. A few have looked at a range of 
factors, although either these were not studied within a framework or some eventual 
predicting factors were not included. This paper, therefore, has the advantages of a 
random population, appropriate sample size and study design. A conceptual framework 
was used for the collection and analysis of the data. In addition, a qualitative study 
(Tekeli-Yeşil, Dedeoğlu, Tanner, Braun-Fahrlaender, & Obrist, in press) carried out prior 
to this quantitative one in the same districts and socioeconomic levels guided the 
preparation of the survey instrument and supplied us with more information about how 
individuals in the study area are motivated to take action. 
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In our qualitative study we conducted focus group discussions and in-depth interviews 
and found that within our conceptual framework about taking action (Tekeli-Yeşil, in 
press) respondents showed three patterns of behaviour. In the first two patterns, the 
process of taking action was interrupted at different stages by associated obstacles (low 
SEL, outcome expectancy – absence of belief in the efficacy of measures, helplessness, a 
culture of negligence, lack of trust, poor predictability and normalisation bias). In the 
third pattern, factors such as living in higher-risk areas, direct personal experience of an 
earthquake (participating in solidarity or rescue activities after past events), higher 
educational level and social interaction played a motivating role in completing the 
process (Tekeli-Yeşil et al., in press). 
The overall aim of the present study is to identify the factors associated with taking 
action for earthquakes through an appropriate quantitative study. We assumed that the 
actual level of earthquake risk and respondents’ SEL are associated with taking action, 
but based on the literature and our qualitative study, we expected that some further 
personal, social and environmental factors would also be associated with taking action. 
 
6.2 Methods 
A field survey was carried out in May and June 2007 to test the research questions. A 
questionnaire created by the authors was used as the survey instrument. 
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6.2.1 Research site, study design and procedure 
Two of the 32 districts of Istanbul, Bakırköy and Beykoz, were selected for the study 
because of their different earthquake risk levels14. The sociodemographic features of 
these two districts are not identical, but it is not possible to find districts with similar 
sociodemographic features and different earthquake risks. Compared with other districts, 
Bakırköy contains regular buildings and planned settlements, the educational and 
economic levels of its inhabitants are in general above the city’s average, and the 
population is older than that of Beykoz15. Beykoz has a diverse building stock ranging 
from gated communities away from the main urban centres to valuable older settlements 
with traditional timber architecture on the Bosphorus coast, as well as unplanned 
settlements and slum areas (gecekondus) which are built illegally, mainly on public land. 
In recent years, because of its low earthquake risk, Beykoz has become popular among 
high-income groups and many gated communities have begun to develop for them. 
Bakırköy is expected to be among the districts experiencing the highest intensity in an 
earthquake, while Beykoz is expected to be among those experiencing the lowest 
intensity2. In these two districts we categorized sub-districts (mahalles) according to 
SEL. The high, moderate and low SEL categorisation was based on information gathered 
from the district administrations (Figure 6.1). 
 
 
                                                 
14
 In this paper, the term “risk” is only used in connection with geological/tectonic aspects. Detailed 
information about earthquake zones and expected site-dependent intensity distribution can be found at BU., 
2003: Earthquake Risk Assessment for the Istanbul Metropolitan Area Final Report. Boğaziçi University 
Press, Istanbul. 
15
 2000 Census of Population / Social and Economic Characteristics of Population; State Institute of 
Statistics Prime Ministry Republic of Turkey, Ankara, 2002. 
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Figure 6.1 Stratification Process 
 
After the stratification process, households were selected randomly from each stratum by 
a two-stage cluster sampling technique. Sub-districts and streets were taken as clusters. 
We randomly selected 2 sub-districts for each SEL category in both of the districts, then 
10 streets within each selected sub-district. Finally, in each street a house was randomly 
designated as the starting point and recruitment continued at the nearest house. We aimed 
to interview a total of 1200 households, 200 in each stratum, speaking to individuals who 
were heads of households and had been living in their homes for more than one year. The 
questionnaire was administered face-to-face by trained interviewers with medical or 
anthropological backgrounds who had participated in a two-day training workshop and 
field exercise. Experienced and trained researchers served as field supervisors, each one 
working with two to four interviewers. Overall supervision in the field was conducted by 
the corresponding author.   
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6.2.2 Questionnaire and measures 
The 56 questions were drawn up on the basis of the findings of our qualitative study and 
the conceptual framework created for the overall study. The questionnaire was tested 
with a small pilot population for appropriateness of inventory and changes made as 
necessary before it was carried out in the study population. 
In order to assess the level of preparedness of each participant, we listed 11 earthquake 
mitigation and preparedness measures that are commonly mentioned in preparedness 
information booklets. The list included structural measures such as having the building 
tested for construction quality, non-structural measures such as fixing high furniture to 
walls, and preparedness measures such as keeping an earthquake bag/kit. For analysis of 
the data, a summary of the number of measures that each participant had taken was made 
and a dichotomized outcome variable, which we called taking action, created from the 
answers. The taking of at least three measures was the cut-off point (mean: 3.2, SD: 2.3). 
Respondents who had taken at least three measures were considered to have taken action.   
The questionnaire included the following explanatory variables. 
a) Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. These included age, sex, 
marital status, a child living at home, SEL of the relevant sub-district, tenure and 
educational level. 
b)  Experience with earthquakes. We asked respondents whether they had ever 
experienced an earthquake, experienced damage, loss or injury in their close 
circle due to earthquakes, or participated in solidarity or rescue activities after 
such an event. 
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c)  Earthquake knowledge score. Respondents were asked three questions to assess 
their knowledge about earthquakes. The first was about the causes of an 
earthquake: respondents could choose answers ranging from scientific to religious 
explanations, or give answers in their own words which we categorised later. The 
second question was about knowledge regarding possible mitigation and 
preparedness measures. We recorded respondents’ spontaneous answers on a list 
that was not read to them. The third question was about how to behave during an 
earthquake. Respondents chose answers ranging from “don’t know” to “drop to 
the ground, take cover under a sturdy table or other piece of furniture, and hold on 
until the shaking stops” (this last taken from information booklets). Respondents 
who gave a scientific explanation as a cause of an earthquake, who could 
spontaneously mention at least two mitigation and preparedness measures, and 
who could describe how to behave during an earthquake by an explanation from 
the information booklets got one point for each question. The points were then 
totalled. Respondents who got at least two points were considered as having 
above average knowledge and the rest below average. 
d) Risk perception score. Risk perception was explored by six statements about risk 
perception. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree (on a three-point scale) 
with statements about risk perception for the district, sub-district, family, self and 
the building they were living in. Those who agreed with at least three statements 
were considered as having a high perception of risk. 
e) Attitudes towards action score. The questionnaire contained 11 statements about 
attitudes towards taking action. These included attitudes towards different types 
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of measure such as structural and non-structural measures and micro- and macro-
measures, fatalism regarding earthquakes and actors in disaster management. 
Respondents who agreed (on a three-point scale) with at least seven attitudes that 
previous studies had considered as action-stimulating were regarded as more 
inclined to take action than the average for the study population. 
f) Respondents’ own statements about reasons for not taking precautions. 
g) General safety score. This was assessed by the use (or not) of seatbelts while 
travelling in the front seats of a car during the previous month16. 
 
6.2.3 Analysis 
The statistical software SPSS® 15 was used to enter, clean and analyse the data. Ten per 
cent of the data were re-entered to check the quality of the data-entering process; only 
minor differences were identified, which were corrected before the analysis. 
For descriptive information, frequency analysis and cross-tabulations were made. For 
cross-tabulations, statistical significance was determined using the chi-square test. The 
association between taking action and independent variables was assessed in a univariate 
analysis. The results of this analysis are expressed as odds ratios (OR) and their 95% 
confidence intervals (CI). A multivariate logistic regression analysis was then made, 
using the option forward LR (log likelihood ratio) in the logistic regression command. All 
significant variables with a p value smaller than 0.05 were entered into the multivariate 
analysis. The variables were entered sequentially. 
 
                                                 
16
 In Turkey it is only obligatory to use a seatbelt in the front seats of a vehicle. 
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6.3 Results 
 
Response rate 
A total of 1123 people were interviewed. The response rate was 93.6% (93.5% in the 
high-risk district and 93.6% in the lower-risk district). The response rate was slightly 
lower in both of the high SEL sub-districts because some of the gated communities did 
not allow access (high-risk district: 91%; low-risk district: 83.5%). 
 
Socioeconomic and demographic characters of the study population 
An approximately equal number of respondents lived in the high-risk and lower-risk 
districts. Their mean age was 48 (SD: 15). The middle age group (35–54) was the largest 
age group, with 46% of the total. The characteristics of the study population are presented 
in Table 6.1. 
Of the respondents, 89% had experienced an earthquake but only 6% had suffered any 
damage or knew someone who had been injured or died in an earthquake in their close 
circle; 19% had participated in solidarity or rescue activities during the major Marmara 
earthquakes of 1999. 
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Table 6.1 Study population 
High-risk district, Bakırköy 561; 50%   (n; %) Lower-risk district, Beykoz 562; 50% Total*1123 
 Low SEL 
195; 34.8% 
Moderate 
SEL 
183; 32.6% 
High SEL 
183; 32.6% 
Low SEL  
198; 35.2% 
Moderate 
SEL 
197;35.1% 
High SEL 
167; 29.7% 
 
1123 
Sex              
Male 77 39.5% 55 30.1% 104 56.8% 117 59.1% 136 69.0% 85 50.9% 574 51.1% 
Female 118 60.5% 128 69.9% 79 43.2% 81 40.9% 61 31.0% 82 49.1% 549 48.9% 
Age              
16–34 49 25.1% 35 19.3% 13 7.1% 58 29.3% 55 27.9% 31 18.6% 241 21.5% 
35–54 93 47.7% 67 37.0% 88 48.1% 88 44.4% 97 49.2% 85 50.9% 518 46.2% 
≤55 53 27.2% 79 43.6% 82 44.8% 52 26.3% 45 22.8% 51 30.5% 362 32.3% 
Marital status              
Married 148 75.9% 121 66.5% 135 73.8% 161 81.3% 171 86.8% 125 74.9% 861 76.7% 
Other  
(not married, 
widowed, 
divorced, etc.) 
47 24.1% 61 33.5% 48 26.2% 37 18.7% 26 13.2% 42 25.1% 261 23.3% 
Presence of child              
Yes 144 73.8% 83 45.4% 111 60.7% 139 70.2% 151 76.6% 80 47.9% 708 63.0% 
No 51 26.2% 100 54.6% 72 39.3% 59 29.8% 46 23.4% 87 52.1% 415 37.0% 
Tenure              
Owns 142 72.8% 137 74.9% 128 69.9% 103 52.0% 118 59.9% 125 74.9% 753 67.1% 
Rented/other  53 27.2% 46 25.1% 55 30.1% 95 48.0% 79 40.1% 42 25.1% 370 32.9% 
Educational level              
Illiterate, literate,  
primary school 
73 37.6% 59 32.2% 38 20.8% 119 60.1% 115 58.4% 8 4.8% 412 36.7% 
Middle-, high 
school 
86 44.3% 83 45.4% 67 36.6% 62 31.3% 64 32.5% 45 26.9% 407 36.3% 
University or 
higher education 
35 18.0% 41 22.4% 78 42.6% 17 8.6% 18 9.1% 114 68.3% 303 27.0% 
* Differences in total n are due to missing values in each item. 
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Taking action 
While 54% of the respondents had taken at least 3 of the 11 measures we asked about, 
12% had not taken any measures. The low and moderate SEL groups in the high-risk 
district had taken more measures than the corresponding groups in the low-risk district. 
The high SEL groups in both districts had taken a similar level of measures and the high 
SEL group in the low-risk district had taken more measures than the low and moderate 
SEL groups in the high-risk district. Figure 6.2 displays the mean number of measures 
that had been taken according to SEL in the two districts. 
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Figure 6.2 No. of measures that had been taken within SELs in each district 
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Table 6.2 shows details of the level of earthquake preparedness in the study area. The 
frequency of testing buildings for construction quality and obtaining earthquake 
insurance were significantly higher in the high-risk area (X2: 296.6, p<0.001; X2: 89.34, 
p<0.001). 
Table 6.2 Frequency of the measures taken by the respondents in the districts and in 
total 
Measures that had been 
taken 
HRD / Bakırköy LRD  / Beykoz Total 
 N % N % N % 
Have the building tested for 
construction quality 
431 77% 144 26% 575 51% 
Have torch near the bed 269 48% 277 49% 546 49% 
Fix / Secure high furniture to 
wall (partly or all) 
230 41% 213 38% 443 39% 
Obtain earthquake insurance 287 51% 136 24% 423 38% 
Have a family disaster plan 199 36% 163 29% 362 32% 
Secure important documents 189 34% 147 26% 336 30% 
Store food and water in view 
of an earthquake 
133 24% 108 19% 241 22% 
Have fire extinguisher  118 21% 122 22% 240 21% 
Have an earthquake bag/kit 134 24% 87 16% 221 20% 
Attend a relevant training 58 10% 70 13% 128 11% 
Be a member/volunteer of a 
related NGO or CBO 
15 3% 15 3% 30 3% 
 
 
Determinants of taking action 
Of the respondents, 14% could not mention spontaneously any of the nine measures that 
were listed in the questionnaire for the knowledge score and only 2% spontaneously 
mentioned all of them. The respondents were realistic in their judgement of risk in their 
district: 85% of the respondents living in the high-risk area thought that their district was 
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at high risk owing to geological conditions, and 80% of the respondents living in the 
lower-risk area thought that their district was at lower risk. However, only 14% of the 
respondents thought that they themselves or their families would definitely experience 
damage due to an eventual earthquake. Risk perception about family, self and home were 
similar in both districts: 70% of the respondents were more worried about other threats in 
their daily lives. Figure 6.3 displays the responses to some of the questions asked for 
assessing the attitude score. 
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Figure 6.3 Frequency of responses to some of the attitude score questions 
 
Of the respondents, 51% totally agreed with the statement that neighbours’, friends’ and 
relatives’ behaviour regarding mitigation of damage and preparedness was a motivating 
example for them. Among those who claimed to be ready for an earthquake, 80% said 
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that they tried to persuade people around them to take similar measures. Negligence was 
the most frequently mentioned reason for not being ready by respondents in their own 
words (n: 256; 28%). 
Table 6.3 displays the factors that were found to be significantly associated with taking 
action. Factors not found to be significantly associated with taking action in the 
univariate analysis were: marital status, a child at home and two types of earthquake 
experience (experience of only the phenomena and experience of damage, injury or loss 
within the close circle and family in previous earthquakes). Based on the findings of our 
qualitative study, we also looked for the association between having a child at home and 
having a family plan for earthquakes: families with a child at home had higher odds of 
having a family plan (OR: 1.5; CI: (1.2- 2.0); p <0.01). 
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Table 6.3 Univariate analysis of the factors having significant association with 
taking action (taking at least three mitigation and preparedness measures) regarding 
the predicted earthquake 
Variable Value Labels n and % of 
subjects who 
had 
taken action 
above average1 
OR2 95% CI  
High risk district  (Bakırköy) 360 64% 2.4*** [1.9 – 3.0] District  
Lower risk district (Beykoz) 242 43% 1  
High SEL 257 73% 3.6*** [2.7 – 5.0] 
Moderate SEL 175 46% 1.1 [0.8 – 1.5] 
SEL of sub-district 
 
Low SEL 170 43% 1  
High  172 68% 3.4*** [2.1 – 5.5] 
Moderate  388 51% 1.7 * [1.1 – 2.5] 
Self-expressed 
economic status 
Low   40 38% 1  
Owns  449 60% 2.1*** [1.6 – 2.7] Tenure 
Rents and others  153 41% 1  
University or higher education  225 74% 6.7*** [4.8 – 9.3] 
Middle school / High School  252 62% 3.8*** [2.8 – 5.0] 
Educational level 
Illiterate/ can read & write/ 
primary school 
124 30% 1  
Male  327 57% 1.3* [1.04 – 1.7] Gender 
Female 275 50% 1  
16-34 110 46% 0.7* [0.5 – 0.99] 
35-54 297 57% 1.2 [0.9 – 1.5] 
Age 
55< 195 54% 1  
Yes 140 67% 2.0*** [1.4 – 2.7] Earthquake experience: 
(Participated solidarity 
or rescue activities 
during the past 
earthquakes) 
No  461 51% 1  
Above average (2-3 point) 363 71% 3.8*** [3.0 – 5.0] Earthquake knowledge 
score Below average (0-1 point) 239 39% 1  
Risk perception score 4-6 (High risk perception) 204 58% 1.3* [1.02 – 1.7] 
 ≤ 3 (Low risk perception) 397 52% 1  
Showed at least 7 action-
stimulating attitudes towards 
action 
350 62% 2.0*** [1.6 – 2.5] Attitude score 
Less than 7 251 45% 1  
Often/Always used safety belt 
in car in the last month 
481 63% 2.3*** [1.6 – 3.2] 
No such situation in the last 
month 
49 27% 0.5** [0.3 – 0.8] 
General safety action  
score 
Never / Seldom used  72 42% 1  
¹ numbers and percentages are given within the group not in total. 
2 
*** p <0.001; ** p <0.01; * p <0.05; Groups with OR 1 are referred to reference groups. 
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To explore which of the factors had the greatest influence on taking action, a multivariate 
logistic regression analysis was conducted. Self-expressed economic status was not 
significant in the multivariate analysis. We excluded this item from the models due to 
high correlation with SEL of the sub-districts (Table 6.4). Gender did not show a 
significant association in the final model and risk perception did not show a significant 
association at all. Being younger (16–34 years) was only of significance in the final 
model. The odds of taking action in this group were lower than in the reference group. 
The impact of factors such as location of the home, tenure, participating in solidarity and 
rescue activities after previous earthquakes and knowledge about earthquakes were 
extremely stable in the analysis, while others altered with the introduction of new factors 
into the models. The impact of the SEL of the district was changed with the entry of 
educational level into the model, and the impact of educational level was altered with the 
entry of knowledge about earthquakes into the model. The last two factors – attitudes 
towards action and general safety score – were also significant predictors. 
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Table 6.4 Multivariate logistic regression analysis of the factors predicting the likelihood of getting prepared for the earthquakes (taking at least three 
precautions) 
 
 Model 1 
Exp(B) Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9  
High risk area  
Bakırköy 2.4*** 2.5*** 2.3*** 2.1*** 2.1*** 2.2*** 2.4*** 2.3*** 2.3*** 2.4*** 2.3*** 
Location of 
 the home 
Lower risk area Beykoz 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
High SEL  3.8*** 3.7*** 2.2*** 2.0*** 2.1*** 2.0*** 1.6* 1.6* 1.6* 1.6* 
Moderate SEL  1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
SEL of the sub-
district 
Low SEL  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Owns   1.8*** 1.9*** 1.8*** 1.8*** 1.7*** 1.8*** 1.8*** 1.8*** 1.8*** Tenure 
Rents and others   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
University or higher education    4.7*** 5.2*** 4.9*** 4.8*** 3.5*** 3.5*** 3.2*** 2.8*** 
Middle School/ High School    3.3*** 3.5*** 3.4*** 3.5*** 3.0*** 3.0*** 2.8*** 2.6*** 
Educational 
level 
Illiterate/can read & 
write/primary school     1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Age (16-34)     0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6* 
Age (35-54)     1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 
Age (55<)     1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Male      1.4* 1.3 1.4* 1.4* 1.4* 1.3 
Demographic 
characteristics 
Female      1 1 1 1 1 1 
Yes       2.1*** 2.0*** 2.0*** 2.1*** 2.0*** Direct experience 
(Participated in 
rescue & solidarity 
activities) 
No  
      1 1 1 1 1 
2 or 3         2.1*** 2.1*** 2.0*** 1.9*** Earthquake 
knowledge score 0 or 1        1 1 1 1 
4-6 - High risk perception          1.0 1.0 1.0 Risk perception 
score ≤3         1 1 1 
7-11 action-stimulating attitudes           1.6** 1.5** Attitudes score 
≤6              1 1 
Often/Always uses safety belt in car 
          1.5* 
No such situation in the last month 
          0.8 
General safety 
score  
Never /Seldom uses safety belt           1 
Model summary of the final model: -2 Log likelihood 1226.490; R2 0.326 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05 
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6.4 Discussion and conclusions 
The differences in the sociodemographic features of the respondents in two districts are a 
reflection of the sociodemographic characteristics of the research site and are not 
systematically distributed in the study population. Therefore we do not think that they 
will affect the results. As an example, we think that the difference in the distribution of 
males and females in the two districts are mainly due to our involvement criteria, which 
led us to recruit heads of households. In Bakırköy more women said they were heads of 
household compared with Beykoz, probably because of the high level of education in 
Bakırköy and the higher percentage of older age groups in Bakırköy, which has an 
influence on the higher percentage of widowed women who automatically become head 
of the household. 
Response rates differed slightly within SEL groups. This might slightly affect the average 
scores, but because of the high response rates in all the groups we do not think that it will 
change the results of comparisons. 
Another issue is the collection of data about the measures that had been taken. We 
recorded the answers of the respondents about the measures they had taken but did not 
verify their responses with visual checks, which would have been the ideal way. 
The univariate and multivariate analyses indicated that respondents’ educational level 
was the leading factor associated with taking action. Educational level had a very high 
OR in the univariate analysis, but it was mainly influenced by the earthquake knowledge 
score and only slightly by age, the attitudes score and the general safety score in the 
multivariate analysis. 
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The earthquake knowledge score also appeared as a highly significant factor in the 
univariate analysis and a stable factor in the multivariate analysis. In the latter, the 
introduction of the earthquake knowledge score into the model is accompanied by a 
reduction in the effect of educational level on the odds of taking action, although this 
variable remains the leading factor. This finding is important for praxis, because it 
suggests that the level of preparedness might be improved by awareness programmes 
containing information about possible mitigation and preparedness measures. The 
findings of our qualitative study help us to comment on this issue more extensively. 
According to our study, knowledge about the risk and its consequences are not enough to 
make people take action; knowledge about how to cope with the risk is more crucial (14). 
This was also the reason for getting spontaneous answers from respondents about 
possible mitigation and preparedness measures rather than letting them choose items 
from a list. It is, therefore, important that these programmes should communicate rather 
than disseminate the information, which was mentioned by Twigg (2007). 
In the final model, the location of the home became the second leading factor associated 
with taking action. This factor was very stable when other factors were introduced into 
the models. In the high-risk area, the odds of taking action were higher than in the lower-
risk area. It should be kept in mind, however, that lower risk does not mean no risk. 
When the unplanned settlements and gecekondus in some parts of Beykoz, as well as 
elsewhere in Istanbul, are considered, it becomes clearer that lower-risk areas should not 
be omitted from preparedness programmes. 
Direct experience of an earthquake through participating in rescue or solidarity activities 
was the third leading factor associated with taking action. It was not at the top of the list 
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in the univariate analysis, but emerged in the multivariate analysis and was stable during 
the introduction of other factors into the models. We also discovered in our qualitative 
study that it was a strong facilitator for earthquake preparedness (Tekeli-Yeşil et al., in 
press). People with such experience could be mobilised to reach different groups in sub-
districts or neighbourhoods. In addition, more than half of the respondents were 
influenced by their neighbours’ and friends’ behaviour regarding earthquake 
preparedness, and nearly all of those who claimed to be ready for an earthquake said that 
they had tried to persuade people around them to take similar measures. These findings 
about direct experience of earthquakes and interaction between individuals regarding 
taking action could be considered in future programmes, and motivated individuals and 
those who had already taken action could be given appropriate roles and some 
responsibility in reaching and educating other people. 
Contrary to the existing literature, it appeared that experience of only the event (Lindell 
& Prater, 2000) and experience of material or human loss or injury in the close circle or 
family (Kalaça et al., 2007) did not show any association with taking action. Turkey is a 
land of earthquakes and the citizens of Istanbul experienced the latest devastating 
earthquakes in 1999. This might be a reason why experience with previous events has no 
association with taking action. Even though we expected an association between 
experience of loss due to previous earthquakes and taking action, this factor was found to 
have no significant effect. The low percentage of respondents who had experienced 
material or human loss or injury in the close circle or family might be an explanation for 
this result. 
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In our last model, home ownership appears as the fifth determinant after knowledge about 
earthquakes. In our qualitative study we saw that tenants regarded their situation as 
temporary and thought that any investment in a rented home was a waste of limited 
resources, plus the fact that in some cases, landowners restrict such activities as fixing 
high furniture to the walls, which they think would destroy the look of the property. This 
finding indicates that existing laws about ensuring the safety of rented homes should be 
improved and widely and clearly promulgated. 
Socioeconomic level, with different measurement variables such as income or job, is one 
of the factors defined as a determinant in almost all of the literature (Asgary & Willis, 
1997; Fişek et al., 2003; Palm, 1998). Even though the SEL of the sub-district showed a 
strong association in the univariate analysis, it showed only a moderate association in the 
presence of other factors, namely educational level and earthquake knowledge. Figure 6.2 
clearly shows that the high SEL group is responsible for the difference between SEL 
groups in taking action. Considering the quality of the building structures in the areas 
where low SEL groups live, these groups should be also primarily concerned as well as 
those in geologically and tectonically high-risk areas. 
Contrary to the findings of Fişek and colleagues (2003), our study showed a correlation 
between intention to act and actually taking action. This might be due to the use of a 
wider range of items in our questionnaire to assess the attitude score. In addition, our 
findings regarding the attitudes of respondents suggest that awareness programmes 
should also focus on changing individuals’ attitudes, especially in terms of belief in the 
effectiveness of measures and the possibility of coping with earthquakes. McClure and 
colleagues suggested a strategy of educating citizens to recognise that damage in natural 
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disasters has more than one cause, and that some of the causal factors are relatively 
controllable (McClure, Walkey, & Allen, 1999). 
The use of seatbelts while driving, which we took as an example of practice about general 
safety measures, was also a determining factor for taking action. In addition, negligence 
was the most frequently mentioned reason for not taking measures by respondents in their 
own words, and most respondents did not give priority to earthquakes among their other 
daily risks. These findings point to the discussion in our qualitative study about the 
culture of negligence in Turkish society and emphasize the importance of creating a 
culture of safety in the community instead. 
Among demographic characteristics, gender and age were significant in the univariate 
analysis, but only age remained significant in the final model of multivariate analysis. 
The odds of taking action were lower among younger people than older, which might be 
due to the starter effect. Generally, young people do not yet have stable economic 
conditions. 
Risk perception was not found to be a significant predictor of taking action in the 
multivariate analysis. However, we suggest further investigation into perception of risk 
for self and taking action. 
Some factors, which were not significant predictors for taking action in general, might 
have an effect on individual measures, for example, having a family plan and having a 
child at home. Additional determinants for some measures could be considered in the 
awareness programmes. 
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In conclusion, regression analysis reveals that preparedness mainly depends on 
educational level, location of the home, participation in rescue and solidarity activities in 
past events, knowledge about earthquakes and home ownership, all factors that cannot 
easily be changed. Among these top associated factors, only the higher earthquake 
knowledge score seems to be amenable to intervention. Thus, efforts should be put into 
developing effective awareness programmes which help individuals to gain critical 
awareness of earthquakes. These programmes should also consider the characteristics of 
different sub-groups in society. According to our findings, educational and 
socioeconomic levels, tenure and age are the most important characteristics to consider. 
Disaster managers should, therefore, be aware of barriers and motivations peculiar to 
their communities. Motivated individuals, such as those who have participated in rescue 
and solidarity activities in past earthquakes, could be involved in these programmes to 
reach other people. Their involvement would not only help access in the community but 
also empower them. 
Finally, based on our findings about the earthquake knowledge score, we suggest further 
investigation into the effectiveness of different types of awareness programme so as to 
work out the best ways of disseminating information regarding earthquake preparedness. 
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7. Discussion and conclusions 
This thesis has investigated the process of taking action regarding mitigation and 
preparedness for an earthquake and its effects at individual level and the factors 
influencing this process. In addition, the level of preparedness at individual level in the 
study areas was also assessed. 
This chapter contains an overall discussion of the methodology and the main findings 
with reference to the original objectives described in section 1.3 above, and puts forward 
some recommendations and needs for further research . 
 
7.1 Methodological issues 
The study is in two parts. In the first (qualitative) part we conducted 12 FGDs with 
individuals living in two districts of Istanbul: Bakırköy (higher-risk) and Beykoz (lower-
risk) and 11 in-depth interviews with experts, authorities and key informants. In the 
second (quantitative) part of the study a field survey was carried out in the same districts. 
The study had the benefit of combining qualitative and quantitative methods. The first 
part of the study presented an in-depth response to the study questions and a better 
understanding about how people react to earthquakes and take action to protect 
themselves against them. The diversity and quality of the data in the qualitative part were 
enhanced by different information sources, namely residents and experts. The qualitative 
part also gave us the advantage of preparing a better survey instrument with its findings, 
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while the quantitative part allowed us to identify the factors predicting the taking of 
measures in anticipation of earthquakes and to generalize our findings. 
The study supplied us with very rich data. Istanbul is a highly cosmopolitan city and each 
district has its own features. It was impossible to find matching districts in terms of 
demographic and socioeconomic features and with different levels of risk in the context 
of the predicted earthquake. The stratified study design did, however, allow us to have 
different SEL groups in both of the districts. 
In order to investigate the process of taking action and to identify the factors influencing 
this process, we considered the whole process in the study design and thus could not go 
into great detail on any one theme, each of which deserves a separate investigation. This 
preference had the advantage of yielding an overview which made it possible to 
investigate the whole process and see the whole picture, but it had the disadvantage of not 
being able to go into detail about each theme. 
 
7.2 The process of taking mitigation and preparedness action in 
anticipation of an earthquake and its effects at individual level 
The conceptual framework concerning the process of taking action described in section 
2.2 above was considered during collection and analysis of the data. The findings of the 
qualitative study showed how individuals proceed to action or where they drop out of the 
process. Generally, the process was interrupted by intervening factors after or within the 
awareness stage. Less commonly, it continued to a subsequent stage or stages, but was 
again interrupted before successful completion. Completion of the process was the least 
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common pattern among the group participants. The results confirmed that where there is 
a risk, the awareness stage is a prerequisite in this process, although usually the 
intervening personal, social and environmental factors determine whether the process will 
continue after this stage or not. 
 
Awareness  
In the qualitative part of the study it was seen that the participants had relatively good 
knowledge about the risk of an earthquake and its consequences but knew less about how 
they might adequately respond. The study of Fişek and colleagues (2003) showed similar 
results regarding knowledge about earthquake risk. Participants had a high risk 
perception for the city in general, which other studies have confirmed (IBB, 2002; Kalaça 
et al., 2007), but they did not think that they themselves were at risk (only 14% of the 
respondents thought that they themselves or their families would definitely experience 
the impacts of the predicted earthquake). The awareness stage was the point at which 
most people dropped out of the process. The findings indicate that awareness should not 
be considered solely as knowing about the risk or even perception of the risk: rather it is 
having knowledge about the risk, its consequences and how to cope with it altogether, as 
well as perceiving the risk not only in general but also personalizing it. The results of the 
multivariate logistic regression analysis are parallel with the qualitative findings. The 
earthquake knowledge score, which also comprises knowledge about how to cope with 
the risk, was a significant determinant of taking action (OR: 1.9, CI: [1.4, 2.6]), but the 
risk perception score, which assessed risk perception as a total, was not a significant 
factor in determining the taking of measures. In both parts of the study it was seen that 
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the awareness stage is crucial and is also the point where most of the individuals had 
problems staying with the process. We are therefore planning to make a further 
investigation with the data and try to find out in detail the determinants of awareness and 
the role of awareness in taking action. 
 
Evaluation of costs and benefits  
A full investigation of the evaluation of costs and benefits in terms of physical, 
psychological and economic costs of taking action requires some additional methods, for 
example preference-based methods. We could only gather some clues about this stage in 
the process. 
In the qualitative part of the study, we have seen that among many daily needs it was 
difficult for the respondents to invest their limited time and money in or to give priority 
to earthquake preparedness measures. Participants usually made clear their preference for 
immediate needs and not for the probability that an earthquake would happen in 20–30 
years. 
Furthermore some of the participants mentioned that they could not bear the 
psychological cost of some measures, as they were a constant reminder of the threat. 
 
Attitude and intention 
In the FGDs it was seen that the creation of attitudes which stimulated intentions and 
finally action was not straightforward. Even so, being inclined to take action (showing at 
least seven action-stimulating attitudes) had a moderate association with actually taking 
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measures (OR: 1.5, CI: [1.2, 2.1]). Statements by the group participants and the survey 
results (Figure 6.3) call attention to outcome expectancy, helplessness and transferring 
responsibility to others. The respondents were right to emphasize macro- and structural 
measures, but this emphasis should not reduce the importance of micro-scale/individual 
and non-structural measures. The damage and other impacts from earthquakes have more 
than one cause, thus mitigation and preparedness measures are most effective when they 
are taken at all levels and for all causes. Furthermore, the studies mentioned in section 2.5 
above indicate that individual measures and non-structural measures could also be very 
helpful in saving lives and properties. Awareness programmes should persuade 
individuals of the benefits of precautions taken at individual level and the effectiveness of 
non-structural measures, most of which cost little or nothing. When the strong belief in 
macro-measures among both focus group participants and interviewees is considered, it is 
clear that state institutions should set a good example to the public. If individuals see 
large-scale action taken at governmental level, they might be motivated to take measures 
of their own. 
In the FGDs and in-depth interviews we have identified that helplessness is a hindrance 
to taking action among individuals and fatalism was rather a way of expressing this 
helplessness. In the quantitative part of the study, a relatively high percentage of 
respondents said that people experience the things that are written in their destiny during 
an earthquake and chance has a determining role in avoiding or mitigating the damage 
from an earthquake. However, when the findings of the qualitative part of the study are 
considered, this relatively high percentage could be interpreted as an expression of a 
coping mechanism. As a consequence of belief in the effectiveness of structural 
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measures, the low-income groups in particular thought that since they could not afford 
the cost of needed interventions they were completely helpless against earthquakes. Here 
again, the importance of persuading individuals about the effectiveness of all kinds of 
measure and hence the possibility of coping successfully with an earthquake and its 
effects comes up. Traumatisation and false perceptions of the damage (the impression 
that absolutely everything had been destroyed during the 1999 earthquakes, for example), 
which is mainly caused by scenes of collapsed buildings and battered people on 
television during the previous earthquakes, contributed to helplessness among 
individuals. This indicates the need for better collaboration between disaster management 
institutions and the media. The media should act with responsibility instead of thinking 
about the ratings. In earthquake-prone countries, such as Turkey, the media should also 
broadcast stories of successful preparedness or scenes of standing buildings in order to 
help individuals understand the causes of the damage or other impacts and realise that 
damage can be prevented or mitigated. 
Transferral of responsibility to others (e.g. state, governmental, local authorities) in many 
areas was also discussed by Inelmen et al. (2004). This phenomenon was also seen in 
both parts of our study, although it led to a contradictory conclusion: on the one hand, 
individuals transferred responsibility to the state, but on the other they did not trust state 
institutions. This point might be discussed in view of helplessness and the culture of 
negligence. Individuals might perceive earthquakes as not controllable and manageable 
and consider they could not protect themselves, and hence transfer the responsibility to 
state institutions. Alternatively, simply saying the responsibility should be transferred to 
state institutions might act as an excuse for neglecting the risk of an earthquake occurring 
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among the other risks in daily life. The results showed that participants not only 
transferred responsibility to the state, but also took the state as an example to themselves. 
Most of the respondents (79%) to the survey attributed responsibility to themselves as 
well as the state for mitigation and preparedness. This high percentage might be 
interpreted as saying what they thought was expected instead of telling the truth. An 
alternative explanation might be the effect of the 1999 earthquakes. In the qualitative part 
of the study, it was seen that the concept of mitigation and preparedness at all levels in 
anticipation of an earthquake came onto the agenda mainly after the earthquakes in 1999. 
The development of new attitudes (in our case, seeing oneself as also responsible) usually 
needs time and people might manifest both old and new attitudes in the transition phases. 
 
Action  
Level of preparedness at individual level in Bakırköy and Beykoz. 
Figure 6.2 illustrates clearly the level of preparedness in both districts studied. On 
average, individuals had undertaken 3 out of 11 listed measures at their homes, but 12% 
of the respondents had not taken any measures at all. Individuals living in 
neighbourhoods known to be inhabited by high socioeconomic groups in the higher-risk 
district were the most prepared in the study population, while individuals living in 
neighbourhoods known to be inhabited by low socioeconomic groups in the lower-risk 
district were the least prepared. These findings parallel the findings of previous studies in 
Istanbul which were noted in detail in section 2.5 above (Fişek et al., 2003; IBB, 2002; 
Kalaça et al., 2007). 
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Data gathered from the quantitative part of the study showed the frequency of each 
measure taken by the respondents (Table 6.3). In our quantitative study, having the 
building tested for construction quality was the leading measure taken by respondents, 
followed by keeping a torch near the bed, fixing high furniture to the wall and obtaining 
earthquake insurance, respectively. These findings are slightly different to the findings of 
the studies mentioned in the previous paragraph. In those studies, learning how to behave 
during an earthquake was the leading measure taken, followed by keeping an earthquake 
bag/kit, fixing high furniture to the wall and getting earthquake insurance. We included 
learning how to behave during an earthquake among the questions in the earthquake 
knowledge score and did not take it as a measure, which should be the main reason for 
the difference, although the difference might have occurred due to the nature of cross-
sectional studies. Studies in other countries showed that preparedness measures were 
more popular than mitigation measures (Lindell & Perry, 2000; Spittal et al., 2005). 
However, our findings showed the opposite if we exclude keeping a torch near the bed, 
which is a measure for use in multiple eventualities such as burglary or power failures as 
well as earthquakes. The relatively higher percentages of those who had had the building 
tested, fixed high furniture to the wall and obtained earthquake insurance should be 
discussed in many contexts. These three measures are all about the buildings. Two of 
them (having the building tested and fixing high furniture to the wall) are mitigation 
measures and earthquake insurance is a preparedness measure. This result might be 
interpreted as expecting a high level of structural damage either due to the magnitude of 
the predicted earthquake or due to the low structural quality of the existing buildings in 
Istanbul. Alternatively, if we consider that earthquake insurance has been obligatory 
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since the end of 1999 and think about it separately, the results might be interpreted as a 
stronger belief in the effectiveness of structural measures and acknowledging the 
importance of mitigation measures taken by the respondents. The latter interpretation is 
encouraging, because we know from public health that preventive measures are always 
superior to cure but less attractive. It is difficult to persuade individuals, even the 
professionals, to take preventive measures for all kinds of health problem. Individual 
belief in structural measures is a good base for disaster management, but we have to 
consider that prevention, mitigation and preparedness measures are a package and 
individuals are best prepared if they do not omit any of them. 
 
7.3 Additional personal, social and environmental intervening factors 
that are associated with taking action to prepare for and mitigate the 
effects of the predicted earthquake 
The process of taking action was interrupted at different stages by various personal, 
social, economic and environmental factors. In the qualitative part of the study we tried to 
identify and understand these factors and in the quantitative part we tried to find out 
which of them were most helpful in predicting the taking or not of action. In the light of 
the objectives of the study, discussion of these factors will begin with location of house 
(different levels of risk) and SELs, before continuing with other intervening factors. 
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7.3.1 Differences in taking action between residents of higher- and lower-risk 
districts and between groups with different SELs 
 
Location of the house  
Of the 561 respondents living in Bakırköy, 360 (64%) had taken at least three measures, 
while 242 (43%) of the 560 respondents living in Beykoz had also taken at least three 
measures. District was the second leading factor (OR: 2.3, CI: [1.6, 3.1]) in predicting 
the taking of measures in the multivariate logistic regression analysis and it remained 
very stable with the inclusion of other factors in the models. This result showed that the 
actual presence of the risk in the general context was well perceived by the respondents 
and stimulated them to take precautions. It is an advantage that the respondents 
considered the actual level of the risk in the districts, but lower risk does not mean no risk 
so the lower-risk areas should not be neglected. Moreover, each building and building 
site, regardless of whether it was in the higher- or lower-risk districts, had its own 
conditions, such as being built on an unstable river bank or being of low construction 
quality. This difference, and the importance of the individual conditions of the building 
and building site, should be explained clearly to the residents of Istanbul in the public 
awareness programmes. 
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Socioeconomic factors 
SEL of the districts 
Sub-districts were stratified according to the SEL present so as to assess the role of SEL 
in predicting the taking of measures. The findings of the quantitative study indicate that 
the odds of taking action among the respondents living in high SEL neighbourhoods are 
higher than among those living in low SEL neighbourhoods (OR: 1.6, CI: [1.1, 2.3]). In 
the final model, however, SEL was only in sixth position: the effect of neighbourhood 
SEL was altered mainly with the inclusion of educational level and the knowledge score. 
This finding is important for practical applications, because as seen in the qualitative part 
of the study economic conditions were often stated as a main hindrance for not taking 
measures among the participants of the FGDs as well as among some of the 
professionals. We have seen in the quantitative part of the study that this argument is true 
to some extent, but it is not one of the main factors. The importance of the knowledge 
score emerged here again, leading us to emphasize awareness programmes once more. 
 
Educational level 
Both parts of the study indicated the importance of educational level in taking action. In 
the focus groups it was seen that educated people were better informed about the risk and 
how to cope with it. Even within the low SEL groups, individuals with more education 
were better informed and prepared than the others. The quantitative part of the study also 
clearly indicated that educational level is the leading factor associated with taking action. 
The likelihood of taking action among respondents with university or higher education 
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(OR: 2.8, CI: [1.9, 3.7]) and respondents with a middle- or high-school diploma (OR: 2.6, 
CI: [1.8, 4.4]) was higher than in the reference group (illiterate, literate, primary-school 
diploma). Possible explanations for this finding might be problems in accessing 
information sources and/or provision of inappropriate information, which could lead to 
difficulties in understanding the information supplied among those with lower levels of 
education. The results show that the reference group is one of the groups that needs to be 
prioritized in disaster preparedness programmes and indicate the importance of 
developing appropriate programmes for these groups. 
 
Tenure 
In the qualitative part of the study, tenure (home ownership) featured in the discussions 
and was also reported in the working paper as a factor associated with taking action. Its 
importance was mainly revealed in the quantitative part of the study. This shows again 
the advantage of using mixed methods. The odds of taking action among respondents 
who owned their homes were higher than among tenants (OR: 1.8, CI: [1.3, 2.4]). The 
qualitative part of the study revealed that measures related to the building, such as 
retrofitting it, fixing high furniture to the wall and obtaining earthquake insurance were 
rare among tenants. Forty-two per cent of housing units in Istanbul are not owned by the 
occupants (TUIK, 2009b), so this group must also be given priority in disaster 
management programmes. Existing laws about ensuring the safety of rented homes 
should be improved and should be promulgated clearly within awareness programmes, so 
that tenants could force their landlords to take the required measures. 
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7.3.2 Personal factors 
Contrary to the previous studies, among the demographic factors (Lindell & Whitney, 
2000) marital status and presence of a child in the home were not found to be 
significantly associated with taking action. Our sample was mainly composed of married 
individuals with a child at home, which is characteristic of the population17 and might 
explain the varied results. However, as in the example of the association between having 
a family plan and a child in the home, these factors might have associations with 
particular measures. 
 
Gender and age 
Gender did not feature in the discussions either during the focus groups or the in-depth 
interviews. In the univariate analysis, it was weakly significant but lost significance with 
the inclusion of other factors in the models. In the literature, gender was mainly 
associated with risk perception rather than with taking action (Fişek et al., 2003). 
Neither did age emerge as a factor associated with taking action in the qualitative part of 
the study, even though the FGDs encompassed diverse age and gender groups. In the 
quantitative part, the odds of taking action in the younger age group were less than in the 
older group (OR: 0.6; CI: [0.4, 0.99]). However, the results showed a weak association 
and the CI is very close to 1. 
 
 
                                                 
17
 See DIE, 2002 for the results of the population census.  
Discussion and conclusions 
 141 
Experience 
We asked three questions about the types of respondents’ earthquake experience: 
experience of the earthquake tremor only; experience of damage, injury or loss within the 
close circle and family due to an earthquake; and participation in rescue or solidarity 
activities after the previous earthquakes. The first two kind of experience did not show 
significant associations in the analysis, contrary to the findings of a national study 
(Kalaça et al., 2007). The difference might be either due to using a different dependent 
variable (Kalaça and her colleagues took the number of measures that had been taken, 
whereas we used the taking of at least three measures or not as a dependent variable) or 
the low percentage of respondents who had experienced material or human loss or injury 
in the close circle. 
The third type of experience, participation in rescue and solidarity activities during the 
previous earthquakes, appeared to be an important factor both in the qualitative and the 
quantitative parts of the study. In the FGDs, participants who had had such experience 
were the ones who demonstrated the highest level of preparedness and were most 
motivated to take action. In the multivariate logistic regression analysis, having direct 
experience through participating in rescue and solidarity activities during the previous 
earthquakes was the third factor associated with taking action (OR: 2.0; CI [1.4, 2.6]) and 
remained very stable when other factors were included in the models. We suggest that 
such individuals should be involved in awareness programmes and given appropriate 
responsibilities. They are motivated to help the professionals reach the people in their 
neighbourhoods and they are living examples of neighbours who have witnessed the 
impact of an earthquake directly and realize the importance of earthquake mitigation and 
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preparedness. Such an intervention could also help to empower the community and thus 
diminish the effects of both helplessness and transferring responsibility to the authorities. 
 
7.3.3 Social factors 
Social interaction  
Lindell & Perry (2000) mentioned that mitigation of the impact of a hazard and 
preparedness for such an eventuality takes place in a social context. Similarly, our study 
showed that real examples are more persuasive than any given information. Furthermore, 
it is easier to spread the desired attitudes through social networks. Women, muhtars and 
people with direct experiences of an earthquake appeared as eventual key persons for 
future awareness programmes. 
 
Culture of negligence 
As discussed by Wisner and colleagues (2004) and Canon (2006), earthquakes are not at 
the top of people’s priority lists. The normal risks of daily life, such as losing a job, 
illness or other risks in city life (traffic accidents, crime, etc.) take precedence. 
However, as discussed previously, ignorance of general safety measures and even of 
these prioritised risks, which we called negligence, is very common both in the 
population generally (TAM, 1999; TUIK, 2009) and in institutions. Our research showed 
that there is an association between practices regarding general safety measures and 
taking action. Any success in creating a culture of safety in society instead of a culture of 
negligence would benefit the fight against all kinds of risk. Safety in daily life could be 
Discussion and conclusions 
 143 
integrated into the curriculum of schools, for example. Workplaces and state institutions 
should give an example to the community by taking appropriate measures: when 
individuals see this happening around them, they could also feel obliged to take action. 
 
Lack of trust 
Lack of trust in the building sector and the institutions that plan, apply and control 
building processes and retrofitting projects, appeared to be an important factor in the 
FGDs. In some workplace safety studies, trust has been discussed within the safety 
culture (Burns, Mearns, & McGeorge, 2006; Conchie, Donald, & Taylor, 2006). This 
argument is also applicable to our case; as well as individuals, institutions and authorities 
are also negligent in obeying general safety measures. Additionally, the common beliefs 
that people in the building sector have an extreme interest in profit and that corruption is 
widespread in this sector (Green, 2008) also play a role in this lack of trust. If there is to 
be any progress in hazard preparedness, the state institutions should take this issue 
seriously and get good control of the building sector. We did not investigate this issue in 
the quantitative part of our study due to the inappropriateness of the political atmosphere 
caused by national elections at the time of the survey.   
 
7.3.4 Environmental factors 
Earthquakes are difficult to predict and happen suddenly. Measures should, therefore, be 
taken continuously, but this, according to one of the in-depth interviews, is a troublesome 
task. Because of the relatively infrequent occurrence of destructive earthquakes and 
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normalisation of life in between, people are less concerned about them or give priority to 
other emerging needs. When people have limited resources, they do not want to invest 
them in an event which cannot be predicted and in any case may not affect them. Low 
levels of planning for the future generally in society (Inelmen et al., 2004) also contribute 
to unwillingness to make investments for an event that can be only be poorly predicted. 
Not much can be done about the environmental factors, but improvements among the 
other intervening factors would also reduce the effect of environmental factors. A 
practical recommendation regarding environmental factors is to keep the public 
permanently aware of the danger of an earthquake. 
 
7.4 Recommendations 
Several recommendations have been mentioned throughout this thesis. For the sake of 
clarity, they are summarised below. 
1. Our findings showed that educational level, location of the home, direct experience of 
an earthquake through participating in rescue and solidarity activities during past events, 
knowledge about earthquakes, and tenure of the home are the leading factors associated 
with taking action to mitigate the damage from and to be prepared for the hazard. These 
factors are not easy to change: interventions would be needed in the political, social and 
economic systems of the country. Knowledge about earthquakes can, however, be 
improved through simpler interventions such as countrywide, effective awareness 
programmes. Every effort should, therefore, be put into the effective provision of 
information about earthquakes to the public. 
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2. Awareness programmes should focus on supplying information about how to cope 
with earthquakes and how to personalise the risk. 
3. Priority should be given in such programmes to people with lower educational levels, 
those living both in higher- and lower-risk areas and in low socioeconomic districts, 
tenants and young people.  
4. People who had participated in rescue and solidarity activities could be given duties 
and responsibilities in such programmes to reach the community and local people. 
Women and muhtars should also be engaged to reach some local groups. 
5. Awareness programmes should include activities targeting at changing attitudes 
through real and persuasive examples. The starting point in this change should be 
people’s beliefs and attitudes about the effectiveness of measures, towards those involved 
in disaster management, and about their own role and capabilities. To achieve this goal, 
communication experts should be involved in disaster management teams and close 
collaboration established with the media. 
6. State institutions should play an exemplary role in taking precautions. 
7. Safety in daily life should be integrated into school curricula with the aim of 
overcoming the culture of negligence in society. As well as schools, state institutions and 
workplaces could be also involved in a nationwide campaign.   
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7.5 Identified research needs 
The previous section highlights the importance of effective awareness programmes. We 
suggest further research about the components of awareness to identify in detail the 
determinants of awareness and its role in taking action. This could be done with further 
analysis of our data set. 
An evaluation of the effectiveness of methods used in awareness programmes with an 
experimental design would be of benefit in enhancing future programmes. It could also 
help to identify and develop appropriate risk communication strategies. 
The evaluation of costs and benefits stage in our framework also needs some further 
research in order to understand the determinants of this evaluation process. 
The two issues of the culture of negligence and lack of trust also need further 
investigation. A multidisciplinary research team including a social scientist would be 
appropriate for such research. 
The identification of predictors for taking each measure independently might reveal some 
additional factors particular to these measures. This could also be performed with our 
data set. 
Finally, methodological research about the appropriateness in disaster research of using 
items with objective or subjective assessments from the respondents, which could also be 
conducted with our data set, could help scientists in future research. 
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9. Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: In-depth Interviews question guideline in Turkish 
 
Çalışmanın adı: Đstanbul’da yaşanabilecek bir deprem için kişisel düzeyde zarar 
azaltma, önlem alma ve hazırlıklı olma sürecini etkileyen faktörler 
Araştırmacı: Sıdıka Tekeli Yeşil 
 
Derinlemesine Mülakatlar Konu Rehberi: 
Giriş konuşması, sözlü katılım onayı ve ses kayıdı yapmak için katılımcıdan izin alınması. 
Isınma: 
1) Türkiye (toplum, bireyler) Marmara depreminden gereken dersleri aldı mı? 
Hayırsa neden?  
Sorular: 
2) Đstanbul halkı sizce depreme hazırlanıyor mu? Hazırlık için bireysel düzeyde neler 
yapıyorlar? 
3) Sizin ve kurumunuzun deneyimlerine göre kişileri depreme yönelik zarar azaltma, 
önlemler alma ve hazırlıklı olma konusunda motive eden ya da engelleyen 
faktörler nelerdir?  
Derinleş: 
Ek sorular sormak gerekirse aşağıdaki veya başka soruları kullanarak 
derinleş: 
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Toplumun / Istanbul halkının depremle ilgili bilgi düzeyi hakkında ne 
düşünüyorsunuz? 
Istanbul halkı var olan riski algılıyor mu? 
Bireysel riskleri hakkında ne düşünüyorlar? Bu önlem almayı nasıl 
etkiliyor. 
Sosyo ekonomik düzey (yoksulluk / zenginlik) nasıl etkiliyor? 
Depremin zamanının noktasal olarak belirlenememesi ya da  beklenen 
büyüklüğü gibi nedenler etkiliyor mu? 
Maliyet – Fayda (gerekirse,  önerideki kurumsal çerçeveyi açıkla) 
değerlendirmeleri önlem almada ne kadar etken? 
Sosyal çevre ve toplumsal destek kişilerin hazırlıklarını nasıl etkiliyor?  
Devletin bu konuda yaptığı çalışmalar toplumu nasıl etkiliyor?  
Toplumun bu konuda devletten, belediyelerden ya da resmi kurumlardan 
beklentileri neler? 
Din / Đnanç, kadercilik etken mi? Ne kadar etken? 
 
4) Depreme yönelik önlem alma ve deprem hazırlığı ile ilgili yaptığınız çalışmalara 
(ya da yapılan çalışmalara) kimler katılıyor ya da başvuruyor? Başvuran 
insanların genel profili nedir? 
5) Nasıl bir süreçten sonra size başvuruyorlar? (ör: arkadaştan duyup, gazeteden 
okuyup, biz ulaşıyoruz vs.) 
6) Hedef kitlenizi düşünürsek, çalışmalarınızın insanlara ulaşmasında ne tür sorunlar 
yaşıyorsunuz? 
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7) Bu sorunları aşmak için sizin kişisel önerileriniz neler?  
8) Sizce deprem konusunda insanları harekete geçirmek için ne yapmak lazım? 
9) Topluma ve insanlara ulaşmak için en etkin yöntemler neler sizce? 
Derinleş: 
Medyanın etkisi nasil? 
Bilim adamları 
Sivil toplum örgütleri 
Devlet kurumları 
 
Teşekkürler. 
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Appendix 2: In-depth Interviews question guideline in English 
 
Name of the study: Factors affecting the process of taking action at individual level 
regarding mitigation and preparedness for an earthquake in Istanbul.  
Investigator: Sıdıka Tekeli Yeşil 
 
In-depth interview question guide:  
Introduction, ask for informed consents and get permission for tape recording 
 Warming up: 
1) What lessons did Turkey (the public and individuals) learn from the 1999 
earthquakes?  
 Questions: 
2) Are the residents of Đstanbul getting prepared for the predicted earthquake? What 
are they doing to prepare?  
3) Depending on your or your institution’s experiences, what are the factors that 
motivate or impede individuals regarding taking mitigation measures or getting 
prepared?  
  Explore: 
If there is a need to deepen the topic, further questions are:  
What do you think about the level of knowledge of the residents of 
Istanbul regarding earthquakes?  
Do they perceive the risk?  
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What do they think about their individual risk? And how does this 
affect taking precautions?  
How does socioeconomic level (poverty/wealth) play a role in taking 
precautions?   
Does the poor predictability of earthquakes or expected magnitudes 
of the predicted earthquake have an effect on taking precautions?  
How does the evaluation of the costs and benefits (if needed, explain 
briefly the conceptual framework) of taking measures affect taking 
precautions?  
What is the role of the social environment or social support in 
individual preparedness?  
What is the role of the state in individual preparedness?  
What does the public expect from the state, local government or 
authorities regarding preparedness?    
Do religion/belief and fatalism play roles? If yes, to what extent?   
 
4) Who are participating in or want to participate in your programmes about 
earthquake preparedness? What are the general characteristics of the people 
participating in such programmes?   
5) How do these people get in touch with you (for example, after hearing from a 
friend or reading about your programme in a newspaper) or do you look for 
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6) If you think about your target population, what are the problems about getting 
attention or reaching people? 
7) Do you have any suggestions as to how to overcome these problems?  
8) What are your suggestions for motivating people to take action regarding 
earthquakes?  
9) What are the effective ways to reach to individuals and the public?  
Explore: 
The role of the media/scientists/nongovernmental or civil society 
organizations /state institutions  
 
Thank you. 
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Appendix 3: FGDs question guideline in Turkish 
 
Çalışmanın adı: Đstanbul’da yaşanabilecek bir deprem için kişisel düzeyde zarar 
azaltma, önlem alma ve hazırlıklı olma sürecini etkileyen faktörler 
Araştırmacı: Sıdıka Tekeli Yeşil 
 
Odak Grup Görüşmeleri  Konu Rehberi:  
Giriş konuşması, sözlü katılım onayı ve ses kayıdı yapmak için katılımcılardan izin 
alınması. Tanışma 
 
Risk Farkındalığı  ve Risk Algılaması /  Risk Awareness and Risk 
Perception  
1) Đstanbul’u etkileyebilecek bir Marmara depremi olasılığı hakkında neler 
düşünüyorsunuz? Böyle bir olasılığa inanıyor musunuz?  
2) Bu beklenen deprem Đstanbul’da ne tür sonuçlara yol açacak, deprem sonrasında 
günlük yaşamda, sosyal alanda, fiziksel çevrede, ekonomide neler olacak, neler 
yaşanacak? 
Derinleş: 
Ölüm ve yaralanmalar 
Binaların yıkımı 
Normal yaşamın felce uğraması 
Đşsizlik 
Deprem sonrası barınma, beslenme gibi yaşamsal sorunlar 
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3) Bu sonuçlardan sizlerin, yakın çevrenizin ve ailenizin etkileneceğini, zarar 
göreceğini düşünüyor musunuz ya da bir kısmının kendi başınıza gelip 
gelmeyeceği konusunda ne düşünüyorsunuz? 
4) Depremin ........ ve ........ etkilerinden / sonuçlarından bahsettiniz (Ya da alternatif 
olarak; Depremin bir çok etkisinden bahsettiniz). Sizce bu etkileri/sonuçları 
hafifletmek ya da önlemek mümkün müdür?  
Eğer mümkün olduğunu düşünüyorsanız bu etkileri/sonuçları hafifletmek ya da 
önlemek için bireyler ve aileler neler yapabilir? Neler yapmalilar, bunlardan 
bahseder misiniz?  
Ya da eğer hafifletmenin mümkün olmadığını düşünüyorsanız neden böyle 
düşündüğünüzü bize anlatabilir misiniz? 
Derinleş: 
Binanın yapısal kontrolü ve güçlendirilmesi 
Ev içinde alınan yapısal olmayan önlemler (ör: mobilyaların sabitlenmesi) 
Deprem çantası 
Aile deprem planı 
Deprem sigortası 
Bilgilenmek (ör: Deprem sırasında / sonrasında yapılması gerekenleri 
öğrenmek) 
 
5) Bu konuştuğumuz önlemlerden en çok ve en az etkili olduğunu düşündüklerinizi 
nedenleriyle birlikte söyleyebilir misiniz? 
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Maliyet / Fayda değerlendirmesi (Evaluation of Cost and Benefits), Tavır ve Tutum 
(Attitude and Intention)  
6) Biraz önceki konuşmamızda, alınan önlemler arasında, en sık bahsedilen önlemler 
..........., oldu. Neden öncelikle bu önlemleri aldınız ya da neden en çok bu 
önlemler konuşuluyor biraz daha açıklar mısınız? (Eğer soru anlaşılmaz ya da 
istenen cevap gelmez ise şu şekilde tekrar sor) ........ ve ........ önlemlerden de 
bahsetmiştiniz, bu önlemleri neden almadınız?  
Derinleş:  
Para / Pahalı / Öncelikli başka ihtiyaçlarım var. 
Zaman yok 
Kolay / Zor 
Etkisine inanç / işe yarayıp yaramaması 
Huzursuz ediyor 
Hayatı, günlük yaşamı zorlaştırıyor 
Allah’ın dediği olur / kader 
 
Not1: Eger kader / Allah’ın dediği olur tarzında söylem olursa; Bazılarınız kaderden 
bahsetti ama yine de aldığınız ya da alınması gereken önlemlerden de  bahsetti. Eğer 
kaderin /Allah’ın dedigi olacak diye düşünüyorsanız bu önlemleri almaya neden ihtiyaç 
duydunuz?  
(Varsa çelişkiyi aydınlatmaya çalış). 
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(Eğer 6. sorunun tartışması açık olmazsa ya da tatmin etmezse, şu şekilde tekrar sor): 
Bildiginiz ya da duydugunuz bir önlem hakkında o önlemi alıp almamaya neye göre karar 
veriyorsunuz?  
 
7) Devletin bu önlemleri almanızdaki, yani kişilerin önlem alması konusundaki 
etkisi, rolü ve sorumluluğu konusunda neler düşünüyorsunuz?  
Derinleş:  
Devletten beklenti deprem öncesine mi yönelik yoksa deprem sonrasına 
mı? 
Örnek olmalı 
Bilgilendirmeli 
Denetlemeli 
Bireylerin önlem almasında sorumluluğun ne kadarı devletin ne kadarı 
sizlerin / bireylerin?  
 
8) Bahsettiğiniz önlemlerden yakın zamanda veya ileride almayı / uygulamayı 
düşündügünüz önlemler var mı? Hangileri?  
9) Kredi, danışmanlık vs. gibi destekler olsa bu önlemlerle ilgili tutumunuz nasıl 
olur? 
10) Depreme hazırlıkla ilgili olarak gönüllü gruplara katılma konusunda neler 
düşünüyorsunuz?  
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Diğer faktörler  Intervening factors:     
11) Depremin zaman zaman unutulması, gündemden çıkması depreme karşı önlem 
almanızı ya da hazırlık yapmanızı nasıl etkiliyor? 
 
12) Çevreniz, eşiniz akrabalarınız, arkadaşlarınız, komşularınız sizleri bu önlemlerin 
alınması ile ilgili nasıl etkiliyor?  
Derinleş:  
Örnek verebilir misiniz?  
 
13) Depreme yönelik aldığınız önlemlerle ilgili sizin veya tanıdıklarınızın yaşadığı 
olumlu ya da olumsuz deneyimlerden bahseder misiniz?  
14) Son olarak sormak istiyorum, sizce deprem konusunda insanları harekete 
geçirmek için ne yapmak lazım? 
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Appendix 4: FGDs question guideline in English 
 
Name of the study: Factors affecting the process of taking action at individual level 
regarding mitigation and preparedness for an earthquake in Istanbul.  
Investigator: Sıdıka Tekeli Yeşil 
 
Focus group discussions question guide:  
Introduction and welcome. Ask for informed consents and get permission for tape 
recording. Each participant (including the moderator and the observer) to introduce 
themselves to the group.  
 
Risk awareness and risk perception  
1) Do you think it is probable that Istanbul could be affected by an earthquake in the 
near future?  
2) What kind of consequences would such an earthquake have in Istanbul? What 
would happen in daily, social and economic life and the physical environment 
after such an earthquake?  
Explore: 
Deaths and injuries 
Collapse of buildings 
Interruption of normal life 
Unemployment  
Shelter, nutrition  
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3) Do you think that you, your family or your close circle will be affected by these 
consequences? Do you think that you will also experience these or some of these 
consequences?   
4) You have mentioned x and x consequences of a predicted earthquake 
(alternatively: you have mentioned many consequences of a predicted 
earthquake). What do you think about the possibility of mitigating or preventing 
these consequences? (For participants, who think that it is possible) What can 
individuals or families do to mitigate or prevent these consequences? (For 
participants, who think that it is not possible) Could you tell us why you think in 
this way? 
Explore: 
Structural evaluation of the building and retrofitting  
Non-structural mitigation measures (for example, securing high 
furniture)  
Earthquake/emergency kit  
Family plan  
Earthquake insurance  
Being informed (for example what to do before, during and after an 
earthquake)  
 
5) Could you tell us which of these measures are the most and which are the least 
effective? Why do you think so?  
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Evaluation of cost and benefits, attitude and intention 
6) During our discussion, X and X were mentioned as the measures most frequently 
taken. Why have you taken these measures, or why were they mentioned most 
frequently? (If the question is not understood or you cannot get an adequate 
response, ask again in the following format) You mentioned the measures Y and 
Y. Why have you not taken these measures?  
Explore:  
Economic resources/expense/other emerging needs 
Time 
Easy/difficult 
Belief in effectiveness  
Psychologically disturbing   
Makes daily life difficult  
God or fate determines what will happen.  
 
Note 1. If there were statements about both fatalism and eventual measures. Some of 
you mentioned that God or fate determines what will happen, but also mentioned 
some measures that you have taken. If you think that it is God who determines what 
will happen during an earthquake, why have you taken these measures or why do you 
want to take some measures?  (If there is a contradiction, try to explore it). 
(If the overall response to question 6 is not satisfactory, ask again in other forms, for 
example: How do you decide to take or not to take a measure that you have heard or 
learned about?  
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7) What do you consider is the role of the state as regards taking precautions at your 
homes? What is the responsibility of the state?   
Explore:  
Is the perceived role of the state mainly for the pre-disaster or post 
disaster stages?  
It plays an exemplary role  
Information source 
Control  
Share of responsibility between the state and individuals 
8) Are you planning to take any of the aforementioned measures in future? Which 
ones?  
9) How would you react if a credit or consultancy support was available to you? 
10) What do think about participating in voluntary organizations regarding 
earthquakes?  
 
Additional intervening factors:     
11) Earthquakes are sometimes not on the public’s agenda. How does this affect you 
in taking precautions?  
 
12) How do your social environment, your spouse, relatives, friends or neighbours 
affect you in taking precautions?    
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Explore:  
Can you give an example?  
 
13) Can you tell us about your or your acquaintances’ positive or negative 
experiences regarding taking earthquake measures at home?  
14) What should be done to motivate people to take action regarding earthquakes?  
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Appendix 5: Questionnaire in Turkish 
 
Đstanbul’da yaşanabilecek bir deprem için kişisel düzeyde zarar azaltma, önlemler 
alma ve hazırlıklı olma sürecini etkileyen faktörler 
 
Araştırmacı: Sıdıka Tekeli Yeşil 
Haziran –Temmuz 2007 
 
 
 
Anket Formu 
 
 
Đlk dört soru görüşmeci tarafından doldurulacak! 
 
1. Tarih  
2. Anketör  
2a. Denetçi  
3. Yanıtlayan – eğer kendisi değil ise (hastalık, 
dil vs. nedenler ile) sadece yakınlık derecesi 
yazılacak hiç bir şekilde isim yazılmayacak 
 
  
 
 
4. Đlçe: 
    Mahalle: 
    Sk: 
    Küme no: 
 
 
Demografik / Sosyo-ekonomik  veriler 
 
1 E 5. Cinsiyet 
2 K 
6. Yaş  
1 Evli 
2 Bekar 
3 Dul (Eşi vefat etmiş) 
7. Medeni hali 
4 Birlikte yaşıyor 
8. Evde yaşayan çocuk sayısı  
1 Okur yazar değil 
2 Okur yazar 
3 Đlkokul mezunu 
4 Ortaokul mezunu 
5 Lise mezunu 
9. Eğitim düzeyiniz 
6 Yüksekokul / üniversite ve üstü 
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1 Đyi 
2 Orta 
10. Size gore ailenizin ekonomik durumu 
nasıldır?  
3 Kötü 
 
1 Kendisinin 
2 Kira 
3 Lojman 
4 Bir yakının ya da akrabanın ama kira 
ödemiyor.  
11. Evin mülkiyeti kime ait? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Diğer  (Belirtiniz) 
 
0 Hayır 12. Daha önce deprem yaşadınız mı?  
1 Evet 
 
0 Hayır 13. Daha önce bir depremde siz veya 
ailenizden biri yaralandı mı ?  
 
1 Evet 
 
0 Hayır  14. Daha önceki depremlerde herhangi bir 
yardım çalışmasına katıldınıy mı? Örneğin 
enkazdan insan çıkarma, depremzedelere 
yardım ve destek çalışması gibi 
1 Evet 
 
Bilgi 
 
1 Tektonik tabakalarda ve fay hattlarındaki 
hareketlerden kırılmalaradan kaynaklanır.  
2 Tanrının hikmetiyle olur. 
3 Güneş tutulması depreme neden olur.  
4 Ay tutulması depreme neden olur. 
5 Yer kabuğunun derin katmanlarındaki 
hareketler neden olur. 
15. Depremin sebebi nedir? 
 
Size okuyacağım seçeneklerden bir ya da 
bir kaçını seçebilirsiniz.  
 
(Seçenekler okunacak!)  
6 Diğer (belirtiniz) 
 
1 Yer seçiminde uygun zemin gözetilmeli / 
zemin etüdü yaptırılmalı 
2 Mevzuata / deprem yönetmeliğine uygun, 
sağlam, dayanıklı bina yapılmalı 
3 Mevcut binalarda zemin etüdü dayanıklılık 
araştırılıp iyileştirme yapılmalı 
4 Deprem sigortası yaptırılmalı  
5 Aile deprem planı yaptırılmalı 
6 Deprem çantası hazırlanmalı  
7 Yangın sçndürücü bulundurulmalı ve nasıl 
kullanılacağı öğrenilmeli 
8 Tehlikeli ve yüksek eşyalar sabitlenmeli 
9 Deprem esnasında ve sonrasında nasıl 
davranılacağı öğrenilmeli 
10 Bilmiyorum 
16. Sizce deprem zararlarını azaltmak için 
neler yapılabilir? 
 
 
 
(Seçenekler hiç okunmayacak, kişinin verdiği 
cevaba uygun bir seçenek işaretlenecek!) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11 Diğer (belirtiniz)  
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1 Sağlam bir eşyanın yanına veya altına 
çömelip başı ve enseyi koruyarak tutunmalı 
2 Hemen merdivenden ya da asansörden 
dışarı çıkmalı 
3 Kapı altına sığınmalı 
4 Diğer (belirtiniz)  
17. Sizce deprem anında ne yapmak lazım? 
Size okuyacağım seçeneklerden bir ya da 
bir kaçını seçebilirsiniz. 
 
(Seçenekler okunacak!) 
 
 
 
5 Ne yapılacağını bilmiyorum 
 
1 % 5 
2 % 15 
3 % 20 
18. Sizce 1999 depreminden sonar Izmit 
ilindeki yamyassı olmuş (tamamen yıkılmış) 
bina yüzdesi ne kadardır, aşağıda okuyacağım 
seçeneklerden arasından bir tahminde 
bulunun? 
 
(Seçenekler okunacak!) 
 
 
4 % 35 
1 Televizyon programlarından 
2 Gazete / Dergilerden  
3 Internetten 
4 Arkadaşlardan / Komşulardan / 
Akrabalardan 
5 Okul / Mahalle / Đşyerindeki etkinliklerden 
6 Resmi kurum ve kuruluşlardan 
7 Sivil tolum kuruluşlarından 
8 Diğer (belirtiniz)  
19. Depreme dair yapılması gerekenlerle 
ilgili bilgiyi nereden aldınız? Aşağıda 
okuyacağım seçeneklerden bir ya da bir 
kaçına seçebilirsiniz. 
 
(Seçenekler okunacak!) 
 
9 Hiç böyle bir bilgi almadım 
 
 
Risk algılaması / Tutum 
 
 
20 – 36 sorular 
Size bazı ifadeler okuyacağım, okuduğum cümleler için tamamen katılıyorum, yarı yarıya katılıyorum 
ya da kesinlikle katılmıyorum seçeneklerinden sadece bir tanesini seçerek cevap veriniz. 
 
 Tamamen 
katılıyorum 
Yarı yarıya 
katılıyorum 
Kesinlikle 
katılmıyorum 
20. Oturduğum ilçe deprem açısından başka 
ilçelere kıyasla az risklidir. 
 
   
21. Başka yerlerle karşılaştırıldığında 
bizim mahallede deprem riski daha az. 
 
   
22. Deprem olursa ben veya ailem zarar 
görür. 
 
   
23. Depremde bana birşey olmaz. 
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24. Evimin depreme dayanıklı olduğunu 
düşünüyorum. 
 
   
25. Depremde insan kaderinde ne varsa, 
alnında ne yazılıysa onu yaşar.  
 
   
26. Depremin zaralarından kurtulmak ya da 
depremi hafif zararlarla atlatmak şansa 
bağlıdır. 
 
   
27. Depremin zararlarından basit 
önlemlerle korunmak mümkündür. 
 
   
28. Bence evin içinde depreme karşı alınacak 
önlemler pek etkili değildir. 
 
   
29. Toplum genelinde gerekli önlemler 
alınmadan benim birey olarak önlem 
almamın bir önemi, bana bir faydası 
yoktur.  
 
   
30. Devletin deprem konusunda hazırlık 
yapıp yapmadığı benim için önemlidir. 
 
   
31. Deprem öncesi ve sonrası alınacak 
önlemler devletin görevidir. 
 
   
32. Komşularımın, arkadaşlarımın veya 
akrabalarımın deprem önlemleri konusundaki 
davranışları bana örnek olur. 
 
   
33. Günlük yaşamda depremden daha çok 
kaygılandığım tehlikeler var.  
 
   
34. Đstanbul çevresinde olması beklenen 
depremi bir süre sonra unutacağımızı 
düşünüyorum.. 
 
   
35. Türkiye depremden ders aldı. 
 
   
36. Olası depremin zararlarını azaltmada bana 
da sorumluluklar düşüyor. 
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Davranış 
 
 
Şimdi size hazırlıkla ilgili bazı sorular soracağım. Bu bölümde tekrar normal sorulara geçiyoruz. 
 
1 Evet 
2 Kısmen 
37. Depreme hazır mısınız, hazırlık 
yaptınız mı?  
3 Hayır 
 
37.soru evet ise 39.soruya geçin, hayır ya da kısmen ise 38. soruyla devam edin.  
 
1 Komşularla anlaşamadım. 
2 Evim sağlam. 
3 Kiradayım. 
4 Arkadaş, akraba vs.den kimse birşey 
yapmıyor. 
5 Devlet birşey yapmıyor. 
6 Semt ya da ev değiştireceğim. 
7 Param / ekonomik gücüm yok.  
8 Zamanım yok. 
9 Tedbir almak çok pahalı. 
10 Đhmalkarlık. 
11 Çevremde nasıl önlem alınacağını gördüğüm 
bir örnek yok. 
12 Birşey olmaz. 
38. Neden hazır değilsiniz ya da tam hazır 
değilsiniz? 
 
 
(Seçenekler hiç okunmayacak, kişinin verdiği 
cevaba uygun bir seçenek işaretlenecek!) 
13 Diğer (belirtiniz). 
 
 
39. soru sadece 37. soruya evet cevabı verenlere sorulacak. 
  
0 Hayır 
 
39. Deprem ile ilgili aldığınız önlemleri 
çevrenizdekilere ve sevdiklerinize de 
aldırtmaya çalıştığınız oldu mu? 
 
1 Evet 
 
Yapısal önlemler 
 
1 Hayır 
2 Evet 
40. Evinizin / binanızın yapı durumunu 
incelettiniz mi ya da incelendi mi?  
 3 Bilmiyorum 
 
 
40. soru evet ise 41. soruyla devam edin, aksi takdirde 43. soruya geçin.  
 
41. Bu incelemeyi kime ya da nereye 
yaptırdınız? 
 
 
 
 
…………….. 
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1 Uygundu 
2 Hayır 
3 Evet 
42. Yapı durumu uygun değilse birşey 
yaptınız mı? 
 
4 Bilmiyorum 
 
Ev içi hazırlık 
 
1 Hayır 
2 Evet 
43. Oturduğunuz evin deprem sigortası var 
mı? 
 3 Bilmiyorum 
 
0 Hayır 44. Şuanda deprem çantanız var mı? 
 1 Evet 
 
44. soru evet ise 45. soru ile devam edin, aksi takdirde 46. soruya geçin. 
 
1 Sürekli kullandığımız ilaçlar 
2 Su 
3 Düdük  
4 Pilli radyo 
5 Yiyecek 
6 Đlk yardım malzemeleri 
7 El feneri 
8 Yedek piller 
45. Deprem çantanızın içinde ne var?  
 
(Seçenekler hiç okunmayacak!) 
 
 
9 Diğer (belirtiniz) 
 
0 Hayır 
 
46. Yatağınızın yanında el feneri var mı?  
1 Evet 
 
 
1 Hayır 
2 Evet 
47. Evinizdeki dolap, resim vb. eşyaları 
sabitlediniz mi? 
3 Kısmen 
 
0 Hayır 48. Yangın söndürücünüz var mı? 
1 Evet 
 
0 Hayır 49. Deprem sonrası ihtiyacı gözeterek evde 
yiyecek ve su depoladınız mı? 1 Evet 
 
0 Hayır 50. Deprem sırasında ne yapacağınıza dair 
ailece bir plan yaptınız mı?  
 
1 Evet 
 
 
50. soru evet ise 51. soru sorulacak, aksi takdirde 52. soruya geçilecek. 
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0 Hayır 51. Deprem aile planınız varsa bu planı 
tatbik ettiniz mi? 1 Evet 
 
0 Hayır 
 
52. Önemli evraklarınızı veya kopyalarını 
deprem çantanıza veya deprem bölgesi 
dışında ya da güvenli bir yerde sakladınız mı?  
 
1 Evet 
 
0 Hayır 
 
53. Deprem ile ilgili bir eğitime ya da kursa 
katıldınız mı? (Đlk yardım, arama 
kurtarma ya da benzeri kurslar)  
 
1 Evet 
 
0 Hayır 54. Deprem ile ilgili gönüllü bir kuruluşa 
katıldınız mı?  1 Evet 
 
55. Depreme yönelik konuştuklarımızdan 
başka hazırlığınız var mı? Varsa belirtiniz. 
 
 
……… 
1 Böyle bir durum olmadı. 
2 Hiç takmadım. 
3 Seyrek olarak taktım. 
4 Çoğunlukla taktım. 
56. Size son olarak depremler ile ilgili değil 
ama genel güvenlikle ilgili bir soru 
soracağım.  
 
Son bir ay içinde kendi arabanızda ya da 
başkasının arabasında ön koltukta 
oturduğunuz seyahatlerinizi düşünün;  
Emniyet kemerini ne sıklıkla taktınız? Size 
okuyacağım seçeneklerden birisini seçin.  
 
(Seçenekler okunacak!) 
5 Tümünde taktım. 
 
Teşekkürler! 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 183 
Appendix 6: Questionnaire in English 
 
Factors affecting the process of taking action at individual level regarding mitigation and 
preparedness for an earthquake in Istanbul 
Investigator: Sıdıka Tekeli Yeşil 
June –July 2007 
 
 
Questionnaire 
 
 
The interviewer will fill in the first four questions 
 
1. Date  
2. Interviewer  
2a. Supervisor  
3. Respondent, If the interviewee needs help 
for any reason (health problems, language, 
etc.), just write the relationship, not the name 
 
  
 
 
4. District: 
    Sub-district: 
    Street: 
    Cluster no: 
 
 
Demographic/socioeconomic data 
1 M 5. Gender 
2 F 
6. Age  
1 Married 
2 Single 
3 Divorced 
7. Marital status 
4 Living together 
8. Number of children living in the home  
1 Illiterate 
2 Can read and write 
3 Graduate from primary school 
4 Graduate from secondary school 
5 Graduate from high school 
9. Educational level 
6 University degree or a higher degree  
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1 Good 
2 Moderate 
10. How would you assess your economic 
status?  
3 Bad 
 
1 Owner 
2 Tenant 
3 Employer 
4 Belongs to a relative or acquaintance; living 
there rent-free 
11. Ownership of the home 
 
 
 
 
 5 Other (please specify) 
 
0 No 12. Have you ever experienced an 
earthquake? 1 Yes 
 
0 No 
 
13. Have you or a member of your family 
experienced damage or injury in past 
earthquakes?  
 
1 Yes 
0 No 14. Did you participate in solidarity and/or 
rescue activities after any earthquake? 1 Yes 
 
 
Knowledge 
 
1 Movement of the tectonic plates and movements 
in fault zones 
2 Act of God 
3 Solar eclipse  
4 Lunar eclipse 
5 Movements in the deep layers of the earth’s 
surface 
15. What is the cause of earthquakes? 
 
I will read you some choices, you can choose 
more than one choice if you want.  
 
(The choices will be read)  
6 Other (please specify) 
 
1 Appropriate ground conditions should be 
considered/geotechnical investigation of the 
building site should be performed 
2 Houses should be built according to the recent 
building codes/well-built, earthquake-resistant 
houses 
3 Construction quality of the existing houses 
should be tested and reinforced if needed 
4 Obtain an earthquake insurance  
5 Prepare a family earthquake plan 
6 Prepare an earthquake bag/kit  
7 Have a fire extinguisher and learn how to use it 
8 Secure high furniture to the wall 
9 Learn what to do during and after an earthquake 
10 I do not know 
16. What could be done to mitigate damage 
due to earthquakes or to reduce the impacts? 
 
(The choices will not be read. Tick one or 
more choices that correspond to the 
interviewee’s response)  
11 Other (please specify)  
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1 Take cover under a sturdy desk or table, hold on 
and cover your face and head 
2 Immediately run away by using stairs or lifts  
3 Shelter in a doorway 
4 Other (please specify) 
17. What should be done during an 
earthquake? 
5 I do not know what to do 
 
1 5% 
2 15% 
3 20% 
18. Can you guess the percentage of buildings 
that totally collapsed in Izmit during the 1999 
earthquake? Please choose one of the choices 
that I will read. 
(The choices will be read) 
4 35% 
1 TV programmes 
2 Newspapers/magazines  
3 Internet sources 
4 Friends/neighbours/relatives 
5 Programmes in school/neighbourhood/ 
workplace 
6 Government institutions or local government 
7 Civil society organisations, nongovernmental 
organizations 
8 Other (please specify)  
19. Where did you get information regarding 
earthquake preparedness? You can choose 
one or more of the choices that I will read. 
 
(The choices will be read) 
9 I have never received any information 
 
Risk awareness/attitude and intention 
 
 
Questions 20–36 
I will read you some statements, please choose the most suitable choice for you (I totally agree, fifty-
fifty, totally disagree) for each statement. 
 
 Totally agree Fifty-fifty Totally disagree 
20. The district that I am living in has a 
smaller earthquake risk than other districts.  
 
   
21. When compared to other sub-districts 
ours is safer regarding the earthquake risk. 
 
   
22. In case of an earthquake my family and/or 
I would suffer from the impacts. 
 
   
23. Nothing will happen to me during an 
earthquake. 
 
   
24. I think that my house is resistant to 
earthquakes. 
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25. In case of an earthquake people 
experience the things that are written in 
fortune.  
 
   
26. Chance determines whether the impact of 
an earthquake can be mitigated or avoided  
 
   
27. It is possible to mitigate damage with 
simple measures. 
 
   
28. Measures that are taken at home are not 
effective. 
 
   
29. Overall measures in the community 
should be taken; otherwise individual 
measures have no meaning.  
 
   
30. It is important for me whether the state 
has taken measures or not. 
 
   
31. It is the responsibility of the 
state/government to take measures before and 
after earthquakes.  
 
   
32. I am influenced by the behaviour of my 
neighbours, friends and relatives regarding 
mitigation of damage and preparedness  
 
   
33. I am more worried about other threats in 
daily life.  
 
   
34. I think that the expected earthquake will 
be forgotten after some time. 
 
   
35. Turkey has learned lessons from the 1999 
earthquakes. 
 
   
36. I have also responsibility in mitigation of 
damage and preparedness for earthquakes. 
   
 
Action 
 
 
I will ask questions about preparedness. In this part we have again questions in normal format  
 
1 Yes 
2 Partly 
37. Are you ready for an earthquake?  
3 No 
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If the answer to question 37 is Yes, skip to question 39. If the answer is No or Partly, continue with 
question 38 
 
1 We could not come to an agreement with the 
neighbours. 
2 My house is strong. 
3 I am a tenant. 
4 None of my friends or relatives has done 
anything. 
5 The state/government has not done anything. 
6 I will move to another district or move in to 
another house. 
7 I do not have money or economic power.  
8 I do not have time. 
9 It is very expensive to take preventive 
measures. 
10 Negligence 
38. Why are you not or only partly ready? 
11 There are no examples around to see how 
measures are taken. 
 12 Nothing will happen. 
 13 Other (please specify). 
 
Question 39 will only be put to interviewees who answer Yes to question 37 
  
0 No 39. Did you try to persuade people around 
you to take similar measures? 1 Yes 
 
Structural measures 
 
40. Have you had the building tested for 
construction quality 
1 No 
 2 Yes 
 3 I do not know 
 
If the answer to question 40 is No or Do not know, skip to the question 43. If the answer is Yes, 
continue with question 41  
 
41. Who tested the construction quality? 
 
 
…………….. 
1 The building was resistant 
2 No 
3 Yes 
42. Have you done anything if the tests 
showed that the building was not resistant? 
 
4 I do not know 
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Preparedness 
 
1 No 
2 Yes 
43. Have you obtained earthquake insurance? 
 
3 I do not know 
 
0 No 44. Have you got an earthquake bag/kit at 
home at the moment? 1 Yes 
 
If the answer to question 44 is Yes, continue with question 45. If the answer is No, skip to question 46 
 
1 Prescription medications for the family  
2 Water 
3 Whistle  
4 Portable battery-powered radio 
5 Food  
6 First aid kit 
7 Torch 
8 Extra batteries 
45. What do you have in your earthquake 
bag/kit?  
 
(The choices will not be read) 
 
 
9 Other (please specify) 
 
0 No 46. Do you have a torch near the bed?  
1 Yes 
 
1 No 
2 Yes 
47. Have you secured high furniture, pictures 
etc. at your home? 
3 Partly  
 
0 No 48. Do you have a fire extinguisher at home? 
1 Yes 
 
0 No 49. Have you stored food and water in 
anticipation of an earthquake? 1 Yes 
 
0 No 50. Have you developed a family plan about 
what to during and after an earthquake?  1 Yes 
 
 
If the answer to question 50 is Yes, continue with question 51. If the answer is no, skip to question 52 
 
0 No 51. Have you ever practised your plan? 
1 Yes 
 
0 No 52. Have you secured important documents?  
 1 Yes 
 
0 No 53. Have you attended a relevant training 
course?  1 Yes 
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0 No 54. Are you a member/volunteer of a relevant 
nongovernmental or civil society 
organization?  
1 Yes 
55. Have you taken any other measures than 
those we have mentioned? 
 
 
……… 
1 There was no such situation 
2 I never used the seat-belt 
3 I seldom used the seat-belt. 
4 I often used the seat-belt 
56. Finally, I will ask a question about 
general safety not related to earthquakes  
 
In the last month, have you travelled in the 
front seat of your own or someone else’s car? 
If you have, how often did you use the seat-
belt? Please choose from the choices that I 
will read.  
 
(The choices will be read) 
 
5 I always used the seat-belt 
 
Thank you 
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